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THE cornerstone of the federal estate tax, upon its enactment in
1916, was the provision-the prototype of Section 811(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code-sweeping into the decedent's gross estate all
property which he had transferred to others during his life either "in
contemplation of . . . his death" or by a disposition "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death." I Without
these aggressive clauses, the tax would have embraced little more than
the property actually owned at death.2 The tax collector then would
have been a timid soul indeed, forced to stand by passively while tax-
payers disposed of the bulk of their wealth in anticipation of the death
levy. Over the years, however, and despite these clauses, the courts
brought the tax collector to his knees. To prove that a gift was made
"in contemplation of death," the Commissioner was forced to embark
upon a hopeless search for "the motives and purposes of one who is
dead, the proofs of which, so far as they survive, are in the control of
his personal representatives." 3 Meantime the "possession or enjoy-
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
2. Section 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916 required the inclusion of all property
"to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death which after
his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its
administration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate." Section 202(c) reached
property held by the decedent and any other person as joint tenants or as tenants by the
entirety, "except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such
other person and never to have belonged to the decedent.' There was no specific provision
relating to property transferred by the decedent subject to a reserved power to revo!:e, alter,
amend, or terminate (but see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929)), no
provision relating to the proceeds of life insurance on the decedent's life, and no provision
relating to property subject to the decedent's power of appointment (see United States v.
Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921)).
3. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Heiner -. Donnan, 235 U.S. 31Z 343 (1932). He
went on: "As the event has proved, the difficulties of establishing the requisite mental state
of the deceased donor has rendered the tax on gifts in contemplation of death a weakr and
ineffective means of compensating for the drain on the revenue by the withdraval of mast
amounts of property from the operation of the estate tax." See also Pavenstedt, Taxation
of Transfers in Conteinpiation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54 Ym L.J. 70
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ment" provision was emasculated by "technical and sterile defini-
tions;" 4 the melancholy story of its progress "from riches to rags"
is familiar and need not be retold.6
Despite a notable elaboration of the statute, sometimes in direct
response to judicial scorn for simpler phraseology, these two clauses of
Section 811(c) 7 remain even today 6f central importance. Moreover,
in recent years they have been emerging from dormancy in response
to more sympathetic judicial treatment. A renaissance of the "con-
templation of death" arm of Section 811 (c) has been fostered by several
Courts of Appeals," but its burgeoning has been tentative and has not
yet received the encouragement of the Supreme Court. The "possession
or enjoyment" provision, on the other hand, owes its new-found
power to the Supreme Court,9 which in January of this year added
spectacularly to its scope by the decisions in Commissioner v. Church's
Estate 10 and Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner." It is with the impact
of these two decisions that this article is concerned.
As this article goes to press, critical comment on the decisions is just
commencing; 12 it will undoubtedly rise rapidly in crescendo. One
writer has said: "From one end of the country to the other, lawyers,
trust officers and their clients have been given cause for great concern
(1944); Lowndes and Rutledge, An Objective Test of Transfers in Contemplation of
Death, 24 TEx. L. Ray. 134 (1945).
4. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 55 (1939).
5. Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 TAx L.
R-v. 395, 437 (1948).
6. Eisenstein, sitpra note 5; Rottscbaefer, Taxation of Transfers Taking gffect in
Possession at Grantor's Death, 26 IowA L. Ra-. 514 (1941) ; Oliver, Property Rationalisin
and Tax Pragmatism, 20 Tax. L. Ray. 675 (1942); Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vi'os
Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax, 32 COL. L. REv. 1332 (1932).
7. The section was variously numbered in the revenue acts which preceded the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. "Section 811(c)" is hereafter used to refer to the parallel provision in
these earlier revenue acts.
8. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 648 (1939) ; Davidson v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Van-
derlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728 (1946);
Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947) ; Com-
monwealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F.Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd pcr curiam, 137
F.2d 653 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944).
9. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Estate of Fields, 324 U.S. 113 (1945)
Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
10. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
11. 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
12. Foosaner, Church-Spiegel Decisions, A New Bombshell to Exisltig Trusts, 27
TAXES 444 (1949) ; Conway, I.R.C. § 811(c)-The Church and Spiegel Interpretation, 34
CoRN. L.Q. 376 (1949); Looker, Estate Taxation of Living Trusts: The Church and
Spiegel Decisions, 49 COL. L. Ray. 437 (1949) ; Note, The Church and Spiegel Cases: The
Meaning of A Transfer Effective at Death, 49 CoL. L. REv. 533 (1949); Schrenk and
Wellman, The Church and Spiegel Cases, 47 MICH. L. Ra,. 655 (1949).
(Vol. 58: 825
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 826 1948-1949
THE CHURCH AND SPIEGEL CASES
respecting literally thousands of existing trusts. A bombshell was
thrown into an otherwise seemingly peaceful situation" 13 by these
decisions. The Church case has already led to a recommendation by the
American Bar Association for remedial legislation 14 and to a proposal
by the Treasury Department to amend its Regulations.1 The Spiegel
case undoubtedly will spur consideration of previously advanced pro-
posals for legislation.16
I. PRELUDE
Both cases were argued in October, 1947.17 The Court was con-
spicuously silent until the last day of the 1947 term. Then reargument
was ordered in both cases,18 counsel being "requested to discuss par-
ticularly" nine questions which in effect inquired whether the Supreme
Court had been mistaken in its view of the "possession or enjoyment"
clause of Section 811(c) in every important case before Hehering v.
Hallock. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson announced that they "dis-
approve the foregoing [order] because it includes hypothetical and
argumentative questions not raised by either counsel or necessary to
decision of the case." The cases were reargued in accordance with
these orders in October, 1948, and decided in January, 1949. Mr. Jus-
tice Black spoke for the Court, holding for the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue in both cases. Mr. Justice Reed wrote a single opinion,
concurring in the Spiegel case and dissenting in the Church case. Mr.
Justice Jackson, without opinion, dissented in Spiegel and concurred
in the result in Church. Mr. Justice Burton dissented with opinions in
each case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in both cases with a single
opinion. Rehearing in both cases was denied in February."9
The cases which enjoyed such unusual attention from the Court had
originally asked only that the Court unravel several important but
minor mysteries which were the heritage of the celebrated case of
Helvering v. Hallock.01 That case, it will be recalled, involved a transfer
in trust under which the settlor had created a life estate in his wife,
the principal to be paid to him if he survived his wife but to his children
if he pre-deceased her. Looking to the fact that "the settlement pro-
vides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a con-
13. Foosaner, supra note 12, at 444.
14. See note 147 infra.
15. 14 FE. REG.1824 (1949).
16. For proposals for federal legislation, see note 71 in Ira. For a state statute enacted
as a consequence of the Spiegel case, see note 69 infra.
17. 16 U.S.L. W 313 (1947).
18. 68 S.Ct. 1522, 1524 (1948).
19. 336 U.S. 915 (1949).
20. 309 U.S. 106 (1940). The Court decided at the same time Hc',cring v. Squire,
Rothensies v. Histon, and Bryant v. Hel'ering, involving similar though not identical
trusts.
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tingency terminable at his death," the Court held that the trust was a
taxable "transfer . . . intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at . . . death." The Court reaffirmed its still earlier decision
in Klein v. United States,21 where it had said:
"It is perfectly plain that the death of the grantor was the indispen-
sable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being
for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the
living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the
tax imposed." 22
The Hallock opinion had started the "possession or enjoyment"
clause back on the road from rags to riches. But it left unanswered a
number of questions, among them the following:
(1) Is the transfer taxable if the settlor's reversionary interest is not
expressly reserved, as in the Hallock case, but arises "by operation of
law"? This occurs, for example, when the settlor provides that the
remaindernmen must be living at his death to receive the corpus, but
neglects to name an alternate taker. Consequently, a "resulting trust"
(a reversionary interest) may arise in favor of the settlor.
(2) Is the transfer taxable no matter how slim the settlor's chance
to reacquire the property? In the Hallock case, the corpus would revert
to him if he survived his wife. But what if the return of the corpus to
the settlor depends upon an unlikely contingency, such as his survivor-
ship of children and grandchildren? 23
(3) In what sense must the transfer have been "intended" to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death? Suppose, for exam-
ple, the reversionary interest, especially if remote, exists only because
the draughtsman of the trust instrument (without the settlor's knowl-
edge) had either overlooked a contingency which would create a re-
sulting trust or, out of an excess of caution, provided for return of the
corpus upon some contingency?
These were the narrow issues which confronted the Supreme Court
upon the first argument in the Church and Spiegel cases. In each the
settlor's reversionary interest (if he had one, which was disputed)
arose only by operation of law and not by express reservation. And in
each the interest was very remote and, it was argued, not consciously
"intended" by the settlor. In deciding the Spiegel case, the Court did
not stray far from these issues. But the decision in the Church case
was on broader grounds, though even here the Court did not range as
far afield as might have been expected from the questions which coun-
sel were requested to discuss on reargument. 24
21. 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
22. Id. at 234. See note 118 infra.
23. See note 65 infra.
24. The Commissioner's Brief on Reargument several times reminded the Court that
[Vol. 58: 825
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The occasion for the breadth of decision in the Church case was that
the decedent had retained a life estate in the transferred property, in
addition to the asserted reversionary interest. The Court held that
the settlor's retention of the income, even without a reversionary inter-
est, branded the trust as a "transfer .. . intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at . ..his death." The decision was in
harmony with the uniform construction of this clause in the state
death tax statutes,2 5 from which it was borrowed by the 1916 federal
statute.23 Though title to the remainder interests in such a trust may
be vested in the remaindermen when the trust is created, the state
cases recognized that they do not gain "possession or enjoyment" of
the corpus until the settlor's death. Moreover, the inclusion of such
trusts had been recognized as a practical necessity: "It is true that an
ingenious mind may devise other means of avoiding an inheritance tax,
but the one commonly used is a transfer with reservation of a life
estate." 27 Yet in 1930 the Supreme Court had held in May v. Heiner
that such a trust was not "intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at . . . death." Mr. Justice McReynolds' characteris-
tically cryptic-and criticized-opinion 2- in effect equated the statu-
tory words "possession or enjoyment" with the concept of title:
"At the death of Mrs. May [the settlori no interest in the property
held under the trust deed passed from her to the living; title thereto
had been definitely fixed by the trust deed."
When this view was reasserted the following year in three per curian
opinions,"0 Congress enacted the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931,31
the cases could be disposed of upon the narrow grounds originally advanccL See 0,. at
pages 4, 17-8, and 55.
25. See Note, 49 A.L.R. 864, 87S (1927) ; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-5, Hassett v.
Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938). State courts passing on the issue after May v. Heiner, 231
U.S. 238 (1930), have not adopted the Supreme Courts construction. In re Kutsche's Es-
tate, 268 Mich. 659, 256 N.W. 586 (1934) ; Rising's Estate v. State, 186 Minn. 36, 242
N.W. 459 (1932) ; Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn. 207, 159 AtL 245 (1932),
aff'd, 287 U.S. 509 (1933). Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has Eaid
that such a transfer "is as nearly the substitute for a bequest as it can be and still remain a
gift at all," hinting that the resernation of income from transferred property might stamp
the transfer ipso facto as a gift in contemplation of death. Vanderlip v. Commissioner,
155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1946), ccrt. denicd, 329 U.S. 72.3 (1946).
26. Leighton, Origin of the Phrase, "Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoy-
ment At or After . . .Death" (Section 811(c), Internal RezCec Code), 56 YAM L. J.
176 (1946).
27. Matter of Keeney, 194 N.Y. 281, 287, 87 N.E. 428, 429 (1909).
28. 281 U.S. 238 (1930). 1 PAUL, FEnm.% EsTATE A,")D GnT TxxrATO: § 7.14 (1942)
and articles there cited; Surrey and Aronson, vipra note 6. For contemporary comment,
see 44 HAnv. L. RE,. 131 (1930); 29 Mlici. L. REv. 123 (1930); 15 M.:.z. L. Rcv. 252
(1931).
29. 281 U.S. 238, 243 (1930).
30. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 23 U.S.
783 (1931) ; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
31. C.454,46STAr.1516 (1931).
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expressly providing for a tax on such transfers. But the amended
statute was later held to apply only to transfers made after its enact-
ment,32 leaving pre-1931 transfers sheltered from tax by May v. Ieiner
and the three succeeding per curiam cases. In the Church case, the
Court reexamined and overruled May v. Heiner though the issue had
not been raised by the Commissioner.
II. THE SPIEGEL CASE
The trust provisions. The Spiegel trust (created in 1920) provided
that the income should be paid to the settlor's three children during
his life. Upon his death, the corpus was to be divided among these
children, with the share of any deceased child going to the surviving
children of that child or, in the absence of surviving children, to the
settlor's other children or to their descendants. There was no gift over
in the event that all of the settlor's children and their descendants pre-
deceased the settlor. The Commissioner asserted that upon such a
predecease of all beneficiaries the trust would fail and the corpus would
be held upon a resulting trust for the settlor and that the settlor, there-
fore, had retained a reversionary interest by operation of law. The
executors conceded that this would be true if the remainders of the
three children were contingent upon their surviving the settlor. But
in their view the remainder interest of each child was not contingent
but vested and would pass (if the child died before the termination of
the trust upon the settlor's death) to his legatees or next of kin, unless
divested in favor of the settlor's other children or children's descend-
ants living at the settlor's death. Thus, the executors asserted, the
grantor had no reversionary interest: under no circumstances could
the property return to him.33
The Tax Court held that the settlor had no reversionary interest and
that the corpus was not taxable. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed,35 agreeing with the Commissioner:
" . . . iThe interests under this trust did not vest upon the execu-
tion of the trust, as contended by the taxpayer, and could only vest
upon the happening of the condition precedent, namely, that the
32. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
33. Their argument may be recapitulated as follows: Any child who survived the
settlor would receive his third of the corpus. If he predeceased the settlor, his third would
pass (a) to his surviving children, if any, or (b) to the other two children or to their
descendants, if any survived the settlor, or (c) to the predeceasing child's legatees or next
of kin, if neither condition (a) nor condition (b) was satisfied. Of course, the settlor
might be the legatee or next of kin of one of his children. But then he would get the
property back not because he had reserved an interest in it, but because the child in effect
had donated it back to him. See note 69 infra.
34. CCH TC Satv., Dec. 14,424(M) (1945).
35. 159 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1946).
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beneficiaries or some of them survive the settlor, and this was the
'event which brought the larger estate into being for the' benefi-
ciaries. If none of the beneficiaries survived the settlor, and that
was a possibility, then the trust failed, and the trustees would hold
the bare naked title to the corpus as resulting trustees for the settlor
...This possibility that the property might return to the settlor
was sufficient upon which to fasten the estate tax provisions. That
the property might return to the settlor by operation of law rather
than by the terms of the instrument is of no significance." '
The existence of a reversionary interest. The contention most strongly
urged by Spiegel's executors in their brief before the Supreme Court
was that the court of appeals had misinterpreted Illinois law in holding
that Spiegel possessed a reversionary interest in the trust corpus. The
Court, through Mr. Justice Black, dismissed the question rather briefly:
"It would be wholly unprofitable for us to analyze Illinois cases on
the point here urged. It is sufficient for us to say that we think rea-
sonable arguments can be made based on Illinois cases to support
a determination of this question either for or against the petitioner's
contention. Under these circumstances we will follow our general
policy and leave undisturbed this Court of Appeals holding on a
question of state law." 7
Mr. Justice Burton asserted that "the weight to which such announce-
ments [of state law] are entitled will vary with the circumstances under
which they are made." 31 Since the Justice decided that "by operation
of the law of Illinois, there here existed no possibility of a reverter to
the settlor" 11 despite the court of appeals' decision that "there was a
property interest remaining in the settlor that was terminated only by
his death," 41 one might have expected a statement of the "circum-
stances" which made it appropriate to disregard the view of the court
of appeals. But such a statement was not forthcoming. Instead, Mr.
Justice Burton said that since the remainders of the settlor's three
children were vested rather than contingent, he was not reexamining
the court's conclusion because "it made no announcement whatever
on the subject of vested remainders." Yet one of the issues of state law
decided by the court of appeals was that "the interests under this trust
did not vest upon the execution of the trust." 41
36. Id. at 259.
37. 335 U.S. 701, 708 (1949).
38. Id. at 721.
39. Id. at 726.
40. 159 F.2d 257, 258-9 (7th Cir. 1946).
41. Id. at 259. It is true, as Mr. justice Burton says, that the court of appeals cited
the Klei case, 283 U.S. 231 (1931), as authority for this holding, but the excerpt from
the Kleh; case which the court was "applying" vas a restatement of Illinois law. More-
over, the court of appeals already only somewhat less explicitly had made evident its viev"
1949]
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter was equally unpersuaded by the court of
appeals, and advanced a novel proposal:
"It is at best a dubious assumption that such a reverter exists under
Illinois law. My brother BURTON'S argument in disproof is not
lightly to be dismissed. At best, however, this Court's guess that
Illinois law would enforce such a reverter may be displaced the day
after tomorrow by the Illinois Supreme Court's authoritative rejec-
tion of the guess. If tax liability is to hang by a gossamer thread,
the Court ought to be sure that the thread is there. Since only the
courts of Illinois can definitively inform us about this, it would seem
to me common sense to secure an adjudication from them if some
appropriate procedure of Illinois, like the Declaratory Judgment
Act, is available. To justify at all the Court's theory, the rational
mode of disposing of the case would be to remand it to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in order to allow that court to de-
cide whether in fact a procedure is available under Illinois law for a
ruling upon the point of Illinois law which is made the basis of this
Court's decision, since the correctness of this Court's assumption
is at best doubtful. . . . A determination so made would conclu-
sively fix the interests actually held by the parties to the instrument
and at the same time leave to the federal courts the tax conse-
quences of these interests." 42
The Justice did not state whether, if the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure was unavailable, he would prefer to dismiss the finding on state
law of the court of appeals or the "argument in disproof" of Mr. Jus-
tice Burton.
The Supreme Court previously has imposed a self-denying ordinance
on the federal courts, requiring them to await an adjudication of state
law by the state courts, only in cases involving the constitutionality of
state statutes 43 or of state administrative action.44 In such cases,
abstention is thought to reduce state-federal friction and to avoid
that the settlor had no reversionary interest because of the contingent nature of the in-
terests of the settlor's three children.
42. 335 U.S. 632, 673-4 (1949).
43. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). The decision
rested upon the "one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitu-
tional adjudication ... that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality.,.
unless such adjudication is unavoidable." For another view, see Clark, Slate Law it the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAL, LJ. 267, 293-4
(1946).
44. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) and cases there cited; see also
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 69 S.Ct. 606 (1949). It is worthy of note that in the
Sim Oil Co. case, even though it involved enjoining a state administrative agency, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, asserting that abstention by the federal judiciary was im-
proper unless "the federal court was practically impotent to enforce state law because of
its inability to fathom the complexities, legal or factual, of local law. . . ." 319 U.S.
315,339 (1943).
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needless constitutional adjudication. Where abstention is not dictated
by weighty factors of this type, however, the Court has said that "the
difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter deter-
mine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground
for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case
which is properly brought to it for decision." -1 To postpone federal
judicial action pending clarification of state law by state courts would
be a seriously backward step in federal tax administration. State law
is relevant to federal liability in innumerable cases, and it would be an
unresourceful attorney-in private practice or federal service--who
could not find uncertainties in the state decisions in many of these
cases.
Presumably a question of state law would have to be in serious doubt
to warrant holding up federal litigation pending an authoritative state
determination. Yet one need not be a prophet to foresee that an ap-
palling body of litigation, giving rise eventually no doubt to a number
of conveniently conflicting "rules," would feed on this one issue. Even
if postponement were discretionary with the district or Tax Court
judge, presumably some limit to his discretion would be set by the
courts of appeals. And they in turn, as well as the Court of Claims,
would require instruction from the Supreme Court, which has found
great difficulty in deciding when the federal judiciary should withhold
its hand even in the grave cases involving injunctions against state
agencies., Moreover, the proposal to remit the United States and the
taxpayer to the state courts-assuming they will accept the burden 47-
overlooks the fact that Congress has provided an elaborate statu-
tory scheme for settling tax disputes, a scheme in which the state
courts play no part.4 3 It overlooks also the explicit injunction against
federal declaratory judgments in controversies "iith respect to federal
taxes," 49 expressing a policy which is hardly friendly to like actions
in the state courts. And it would add the courts of forty-eight more
jurisdictions to the already sprawling judicial network which an-
nounces federal tax law, for it would be less easy than Mr. Justice
Frankfurter suggests to:
".. . conclusively fix the interests actually held by the parties to the
instrument and at the same time leave to the federal courts the tax
consequences of these interests." z
45. feredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
46. See notes 43 and 44 mtpra.
47. See Clark, supra note 43, at 294.
48. A state court may have occasion to pass on a question of federal tax liability in
the course of a probate or other state proceeding. See Matter of Rosenberg, 269 N.Y. 247,
199 N.E. 206 (1935).
49. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (1948) ; see Wilson v. Wilson, 141 F2d 599 (4th Cir. 1944).
50. 335 U.S. 632, 673-4 (1949).
19491
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 833 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Past experience with state court decisions sought solely to "fix the
interests actually held by the parties" as a basis for determining federal
tax liability does not bode well for the future; all too often, the state
court proceedings have been hardly distinguishable from friendly or
non-adversary actions. 5' Even if the Commissioner were a party to
the action, the proceeding would still be colored by the fact that the
issue of state law was of importance only to federal tax liability.
The consequences of a reversionary interest arising "by operation of law."
Mr. Justice Black made short shrift of the distinction taken by Spiegel's
executors between a reversionary interest expressly reserved by the
settlor and one arising by "operation of law." He said:
"In either event the settlor has not parted with all of his presently
existing or future contingent interests in the property transferred.
He has therefore not made that 'complete' kind of trust transfer
that § 811(c) commands as a prerequisite to a showing that he has
certainly and irrevocably parted with his 'possession or enjoy-
ment.' " s2
The validity of this insistence upon a "complete" transfer will be
examined later.5 3 But one can hardly quarrel with the conclusion that
an interest arising "by operation of law" is no less significant than one
expressly reserved. Both "types" of reversionary interests are created
by the words used in the trust instrument and both are legally effective
only "by operation of law," i.e., because a court will attach legal con-
sequences to the words used in the instrument and enforce the grantor's
claim. Restated, the distinction is between rights which are conferred
by a court because the grantor has used well-chosen words and those
which are conferred because the grantor has combined well-chosen
words with judicious silence. So restated, the distinction reflects no
difference. If the Hallock case carries any lesson, it is that identical
legal interests should have identical tax results regardless of the formu-
las which create them. That case overruled several earlier decisions
because in them "a mere difference in phrasing the circumstances by
which identic interests in property were brought into being-varying
51. Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions, 51
YAIE L.J. 783 (1942); Sonnenschein, The Binding Effect of a State Court Decree with
Reference to Property Rights Affected by Federal Taxation, 7 FED. B. J. 251 (1946);
Note, 61 HAIv. L. Ra,. 1033 (1948). In Irish v. Irish, 65 A.2d 345 (1949), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the settlor of an irrevocable trust could maintain a bill in
equity to reform the instrument, so as to eliminate a reversionary interest which was re-
tained only "through the inadvertence and mistake of his scrivener." The bill was brought
after and as a result of the Spiegel case. Since, as the Court held, "no interest of any person
[other than the settlor-plaintiff], known or unascertained. would be affected by the decree
prayed for," it is doubtful that the proceeding could be regarded as an adversary action,
52. 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949).
53. Infra, pp. 840-3.
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forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests-was found
sufficient" to distinguish a tax-free from a taxable transfer. 4 And this
is in keeping with judicial refusal, in comparable contexts, to pitch
taxability on whether an interest has been acquired by words or by
silence.-5
Mr. Justice Burton, in dissent, did not really disagree. He argued
only that the lack of an express reservation "was negative evidence to
the effect that such a reverter was not intended and not desired by the
settlor." 1 It is of course possible that interests created "by operation
of law" are ordinarily the result of the draughtsman's failure to provide
for every contingency and that interests arising from an express reserva-
tion are ordinarily the result of a deliberate desire of the grantor to
recapture the property if the stated contingency occurs. This seems to
have been the root of the distinction.57 But any such "mechanical
distinction" 51 points the way to easy evasion; the settlor who wants a
reversionary interest can get it by golden silence. Mr. Justice Burton
himself confesses that "the existence of such a reverter, accordingly,
may or may not have been intended in fact." 11
The role of the decedent's "intent." Assuming with Mr. Justice Burton
that the lack of an express reservation is "negative evidence" of the
settlor's intent, is his intent of importance? The statute embraces
"transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after . ..death." While the courts had never previously laid much
stress on the word "intended," 11 Mr. Justice Black in effect read it out
of the statute:
"... [T]he taxability of a trust corpus under this provision of
§ 811(c) does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the
nature and operative effect of the trust transfer. . . . [It is im-
material whether such a present or future interest, absolute or
contingent, remains in the grantor because he deliberately reserves
it or because, without considering the consequences, he conveys
away less than all of his property ownership and attributes, pres-
ent or prospective. ... [A] post-death attempt to probe the set-
tlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the
effectiveness of the 'possession or enjoyment' provision as an in-
strument to frustrate estate tax evasions." c,
54. 309 U.S. 106, 114 (1940).
55. Howard v. United States, 125 F,2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Vaccaro v. United States,
149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939), ccri.
denied, 309 U.S. 680 (1940).
56. 335 U.S. 701, 731 (1949).
57. See Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F2d 54 (3d Cir. 1941); Estate of Dowme, 2
T.C. 967 (1943) ; Estate of Cass, 3 T.C. 562 (1944).
58. PAUL, FEDm. ESTATE AND Gir TA.XATON § 7.23, p. 179 (1946 Supp.).
59. 335 U.S. 701, 729 (1949).
60. But see Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 5S F. Supp. 565 (Ct.
C1. 1945) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 697, 704 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (dissent-
ing opinion).
61. 335 U.S. 701, 705-6 (1949).
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Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting, urged that the corpus should not be
included unless "the settlor did actually intend that the 1920 transfer
take effect in possession or enjoyment upon the expiration of the trust
at his death." 62 He found "uncontroverted and convincing evidence
of the absence of any such factual intent on the part of the settlor" 11
in the facts that the trust instrument made no mention of a reversion
to the settlor, that the reversionary interest (if there was one) was of
trivial value, and that the draughtsman of the instrument testified
that the settlor intended to make an absolute gift of the corpus. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter did not discuss the question of the settlor's intent.
His suggestion that the existence of a reversionary interest be deter-
mined by an authoritative state court decision may imply agreement
with the majority that such an interest would support the tax regard-
less of the settlor's intent.
The majority is on firm ground in its refusal to conduct a post mor-
tem probe of the settlor's motives. The "contemplation of death" pro-
vision has bogged down because its application is tied to a dead man's
state of mind.14 Whatever the controversies generated by the "pos-
session or enjoyment" provision, at least its application so far has not
entailed a similar futile search. To impose a subjective standard upon
this part of Section 811 (c) would needlessly convert it into an auxiliary
of the ineffectual "contemplation of death" provision.
The remoteness of the settlor's reversionary interest. More troublesome
is Mr. Justice Black's view that the corpus is includible no matter how
fantastic the possibility of reacquisition.5 The I-allock principle has
62. Id. at 729. Deliberate retention of a reversionary interest which is extinguished
by the settlor's death would stamp the transfer, in Mr. Justice Burton's view, as "intended"
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death. But even without retaining a rever-
sionary interest, the settlor might betray his intent by providing for termination of the
trust and distribution of the corpus at death. This would reveal an "intent" to postpone
the possession or enjoyment of the remaindermen until that date and the transfer could
easily be said to be "intended" to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death. The
argument collides, however, with Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., infra, pp. 843-5. Unless
that case falls, the choice is between disregarding the settlor's intent with Mr. Justice
Black and demanding with Mr. Justice Burton evidence that the settlor "intended" to
postpone possession or enjoyment by retaining an interest in the property until death, If
the retention is inadvertent, the settlor hardly can be said to have "intended" the transfer
to take effect at death except by describing any conduct by a rational person as "intended."
63. 335 U.S. 701, 735 (1949).
64. See note 3 supra.
65. 335 U.S. 701, 707 (1949). This conclusion had already been adumbrated in three
post-Hallock decisions by the Court, cited by Mr. Justice Black to support his holding.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945); Commissioner v.
Estate of Field, 324 U.S. 113 (1945) ; Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
But in both the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. case and the Field case, grant of certiorari
was limited to the question of whether, assunting the transfer to be taxable, the value of
the entire corpus rather than of the reversionary interest was to be included. Nevertheless,
the Court in the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. case said that the transfer had been
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been pushed to a "drily logical extreme" 11 when a transfer is taxed
because the grantor will recapture the corpus if he outlives his children
and grandchildren. In the Spiegel case, the grantor had three children
at the time the trust was created; even assuming that they would have
no descendants, he then had 17 chances out of 1000 to get the property
back; this interest was worth $4,500, based upon a corpus value of more
than $1,140,000. Just before his death, the chances had diminished to
16 out of 100,000 and the value of the reversionary interest had sunk
to $85. The estate tax cost of this sweepstakes ticket was more than$450,000.67
Of course, there is only a difference in degree between the slim
chance of reacquisition in the Spiegel case and the substantial likeli-
hood which justified the tax in the Hallock case. But there is also (in
any practical sense, and taxation is an "intensely practical matter") 13
only a difference of degree--and a smaller difference at that-between
Spiegel's vain hope of reacquisition and no hope at all. If Spiegel had
thrown away his sweepstakes ticket, he would have saved his heirs
$450,000. It is inconceivable that he would have retained it with kmowl-
edge of the consequences.
A settlor can achieve this estate tax saving by guarding against a
reversionary interest when the trust is created; and it is possible that
carelessness at the outset can be corrected by relinquishing the rever-
sionary interest when its existence is discovered.c The gift tax cost
"correctly" held to be within Section 811(c). In none of the three cases was the Court
squarely faced with the issue of whether remoteness is wholly irrelevant. In the Ficid cas%
supra, at 116, where the Court volunteered its view that "[i]t makes no difference... how
remote or uncertain may be the decedent's reversionary interest," the interest was worth
$24,930.76 on the date of death against a corpus of $157,452.82.
66. The phrase is that of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
67. Brief for Petitioners, p. 4; see Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting, 335 U.S. 701, 733
(1949) ; findings of fact in opinion of Tax Court, CCH TC SEMv., Dec. 14,424(M) (1945).
68. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 2S0 U.S. 204, 212 (1930).
69. A clause in the Spiegel trust instrument could have provided specifically that the
remainder interest of any child predeceasing the settlor should pass to the other benefici-
aries surviving him or, if no beneficiary survived him, to his estate. This would have
supplied a firm foundation for the argument of the executors, note 33 supra, that the
settlor could then take only if he were the legatee or next of kin of the predeceasing child.
The possibility of recapturing the corpus in this event, dependent as it is upon the child's
failure to name a legatee other than the settlor, hardly could be thought to brand the trust
as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. See
Estate of Houghton, 2 T.C. 871 (1943). In Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 637
(1945), the Court held taxable the proceeds of insurance because the decedent had retained
a reversionary interest for his estate, though his interest could have been cut off by the
beneficiary, who had the right to assign or surrender the policy. But the sacrifice of poten-
tial value which results from the surrender of an unmatured policy would serve to deter
such action by the beneficiary (cf. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941)). Cone-
quently an opportunity to receive the proceeds of insurance if the beneficiary fails to sur-
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of an original final gift over or of a later relinquishment would be
trivial. 0 The simple fact is that the Hallock rule, unexceptionable as
applied to transfers involving a reasonable likelihood of reacquisition,
will often be a tax on bad draughtsmanship. In fact, the niceties of
conveyancing being what they are, even a careful draughtsman may
find that he has not provided for every contingency because a remainder
is less vested than he thought or because he has overlooked some other
ancient loophole equally unrelated to the policy of the taxing statute.
It now appears that the "unwitty diversities" and "elusive and subtle
casuistries" of the law of property were not deported from the law of
taxation by the Hallock case. They were rather elevated to new heights.
Draughtsmen will have to study, as never before, the sacred books of
Fearne, Gray, and Leake for the incantations which exorcise rever-
sionary interests. The Government, for its part, will worship at the
shrine of Contingent Remainder, Worthier Title, Condition of Survivor-
ship, and similar tribal deities. The more tax-conscious the grantor,
the more likely his success in propitiating these deities before his death.
Only the naive and unsophisticated need be sacrificed.
This is not to say that the author agrees with current proposals to
tax only the actuarial value (just before death) of the settlor's rever-
render or assign the policy is not comparable to an opportunity to obtain the corpus of a
trust if the remainderman does not dispose of it by will. See also PAuL, FEDmAL EsTATE:
AND G=~r TAxAT N § 7.23 (1946 Supp.), and Looker, supra note 12, for other methods of
eliminating reversionary interests. Another route to avoidance of the Spiegcl decision has
been attempted by the Minnesota legislature. A statute, approved on March 26, 1949, pro-
vides that under stated circumstances reversionary interests not intended by the settlor
shall be held for the State rather than for the persons otherwise entitled to them. The stat-
ute, Chapter 201, Minnesota Laws of 1949, applies "if by the terms of the controlling trust
instrument the settlor manifested irrevocably his intention to divest himself of all interest"
in the property or "expressly and irrevocably surrendered the right to revoke the trust
and the right to make the settlor or the estate of the settlor a beneficiary" of the property.
If either of these conditions is met, any interest which otherwise "would be recognized in
the settlor of the trust or the estate of the settlor or the heirs at law of the settlor as such
.. shall be deemed to be held upon a resulting trust for the State of Minnesota." C.C.H.
FED. ESTATE AND Gin-r TAx REP., Report Letter No. 6, p. 2 (April 5, 1949). Thus an tin-
successful attempt to make a complete gift to named beneficiaries may effect a gift to the
state. Undoubtedly constitutional objections will be advanced against the statute.
70. The amount of the gift would be the actuarial value of the reversionary interest
disposed of. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). It might be impossible to
calculate the value of the reversionary interest separately from the value of the remainder.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). This problem would be troublesome if a
reversionary interest, retained at the time of the original transfer, was relinquished in
response to the Hallock or Spiegel case. Even then, if a gift tax had been paid on creation
on the combined values of the inseparable reversionary and remainder interests, presumably
no additional tax would be payable when the reversion was relinquished. But query, if the
rates, exclusions, or specific exemption had changed. A relinquishment for the sole pur-
pose of avoiding estate tax no doubt would be a transfer in contemplation of death. But the
value to be included is veiled in mystery; cf. the related problem discussed in note 165
infra.
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sionary interest.7 ' Where the settlor has retained a real chance to
recapture the corpus, as in the Hallock case, the tax should embrace
the value of both the reversionary and the remainder interest. Both
are in suspense until the settlor's death. The Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co. and Field cases 7 2 settle the issue in a way that is consonant
with both the function and the language of the statute. If the settlor
retains a life estate, the tax is levied not on the value of that estate
just before the settlor's death, but rather on the value of the corpus
which for the first time is directly enjoyed by the remainderman.
Where the settlor has a substantial reversionary interest, there is an
at least comparable improvement in the remainderman's status. And
it is therefore equally appropriate to tax the corpus.
The remedy for the Spiegel absurdity is not legislation to destroy the
Hallock rule. It is rather to treat reversionary interests of insignificant
value as de minimisY3 In a related area, the Treasury itself has ruled
that certain types of events may be disregarded in determining liability
under Section 811(c) if they are "unreal." 74 This judgment must be
made in connection with the provision in T.D. 5512, the "Hallock
regulation," that a transfer is not taxable if the beneficiaries need not
survive the grantor to obtain possession or enjoyment of the transferred
property.75 The regulation states:
"Where possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be
obtained by beneficiaries either by surviving the decedent or
through the occurrence of some other event or through the exer-
cise of a power, subparagraph (1) [limiting the tax to transfers
where possession or enjoyment can be obtained only by beneficiar-
ies who must survive the decedent] shall not be considered as satis-
fied unless from a consideration of the terms and circumstances
of the transfer as a whole, the power or event is deemed to be unreal,
in which case such event or power shall be disregarded."
Thus if a named beneficiary may obtain the property either by sur-
viving the grantor or by exercising an unrestricted power of appoint-
ment, the transfer would not be taxable.76 Since exercise of an un-
71. HR. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; passed by House of Representatives, 94
CONG. Rxc. 9322 (June 19, 1948); see H.R. REP. No. 20S7, S0th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
For similar earlier proposals see SH.ATrucK, AN EsTATE PLA Tr.E's HA-DmODr 258-9
(1948).
72. Note 65 supra.
73. A trust like Spiegel would not necessarily be free from tax because the rever-
sionary interest was insignificant. If Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. were to be abandoned,
see infra, pp. 843-5, the Spiegel trust would be taxable because it terminated upon the set-
tlor's death. But the existence of a fantastic reversionary interest should be irrelevant.
74. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17.
75. The regulation establishes two criteria of taxability, both of which must be met:
the survivorship requirement described here, and the retention by the decedent of an in-
terest in the transferred property, infra, p. 843.
76. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, Example (8).
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restricted power is a real possibility, the transfer is not one under which,
as a practical matter, the beneficiary must survive the grantor to
obtain possession or enjoyment of the property. If, however, the
beneficiary could obtain possession or enjoyment either by surviving
the grantor or by surviving his own descendants, the transfer probably
would be taxable. For the road to enjoyment via surviving one's own
descendants is "unreal," and the only practicable route for the bene-
ficiary would be to survive the grantor. If the Bureau of Internal
Revenue can draw a line between "real" and "unreal" events for this
purpose, it should be equally able to decide what reversionary interests
are so remote as to be ignored.
The Court has said that the Hallock and Spiegel reversionary inter-
ests fall in the same category and that both are fundamentally different
from transfers where no interest remains in the grantor. The rule
sacrifices sense to certainty. To classify Spiegel interests with com-
plete transfers, distinguishing both from I-allock interests, would have
been to give up certainty for the always tantalizing search for sense.
It would not have been an impossible task of judicial administration.
The courts could have been assisted by a Treasury administrative rul-
ing that a reversionary interest worth, for example, less than 5% of
the corpus should be ignored."
Are all reversionary interests embraced by Section 8zi(c)? In the
Spiegel case, the transferor would regain the corpus if he survived his
children and grandchildren; if he predeceased any of them, his rever-
sionary interest was extinguished. In this respect, the case resembled
the Hallock case, where the corpus would have returned to the grantor
only if he survived his wife. The possession or enjoyment of the re-
maindermen of such trusts is assured only by the settlor's predecease;
until then, their expectation of "coming into" the property may be
disappointed by their predecease.
But what of the manifold situations where, though the settlor posses-
ses a reversionary interest, his death is not a date of consequence to the
remaindermen? To take an example from T.D. 5512, the so-called
Hallock regulation:
"The decedent, during his life, transferred property in trust, giv-
ing the income therefrom to his son for life and the remainder to his
son's surviving issue. If no issue survived the life tenant, the
property was to revert to the decedent or his estate." 78
77. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1946), establishing mathematical criteria
for application of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
78. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, Example (2). A variation upon the same principle
is illustrated by Example (4). There, however, the death of the grantor is a date of con-
sequence to the son's heirs, though not to the son himself. The regulation renounces a
Government victory: Estate of Dominick v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1946),
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The significant feature of this transfer is that possession or enjoyment
of the corpus may pass to the remaindermen during the transferor's
life. This distinguishes the trust from the Spiegel and Itallock trusts,
where so long as the settlor lived the remaindermen could never be
certain of possessing or enjoying the corpus. Conversely, from the
point of view of the transferor, the contingency upon which the prop-
erty (in the example) will return to him is not (as in the Spiegel and
Hallock cases) his survivorship of the remaindermen. Whether he sur-
vives his son or not, the property will revert (to him or to his estate)
if his son dies without issue. This event may occur before, at, or after,
his death.
Is such a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the settlor's death?
Though the Hallock case had induced a myopic fascination with
reversionary interests per se, the Treasury Regulations say that a trust
of this type is not taxable. 79 The decedent retained a reversionary
interest, but it was not necessary for the remaindermen to survive him
to obtain possession or enjoyment of the propert3. The Regulations
insist that the transfer is not taxable unless such a condition of sur-
vivorship is imposed upon the beneficiaries. "The establishment of
this factor as an additional requirement for taxabilit3, is the principal
contribution of T.D. 5512." so
What is the bearing of the Spiegel case on transfers of this type? The
Spiegel facts, as has been noted, did not require a decision on the issue.
But the Supreme Court is not easily "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined."
Mr. Justice Black said:
"In the Church case we stated that a trust transaction cannot be
held to alienate all of a settlor's 'possession or enjoyment' under
§ 811(c) unless it effects 'a bona fide transfer in which the settlor,
absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible
reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his possession and
all of his enjoyment of the transferred property. After such a
transfer has been made, the settlor must be left with no present
legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that
title, and no right to possess or enjoy the property then or there-
after. In other words, such a transfer must be immediate and out
and out, and must be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or
dies.' "3
79. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17.
80. Platt, Tie Ne-. Hallock Rcgulation, 2 TAx L. Rr-v. 94, 95 (1946). The peculiar
case of Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945), see note 65
supra, meets this requirement of the regulations, see Example (5), only because of the
settlor's reserved life estate. See Conay, supra note 12, at 3M2-5; PAULr, Fn ,r.i EsTATE
AND Gr TAxATiox § 7.23 (1946 Supp.). In the importance attributed to the pre-1931
reservation of a life estate, the case may be regarded as a bridge between the Halloch and
Church cases.
81. 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949).
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Although the transfers which we are now considering are "unaffected
by whether the grantor lives or dies," they do leave the grantor with a
"possible reversionary interest" and in that sense they are not "out
and out." It would seem to follow from the Justice's almost exasper-
ated insistence upon the necessity for a clean break that the transfers
are includible.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Justice's reference to:
"... that 'complete' kind of transfer that § 811(c) commands as a
prerequisite to a showing that [the transferor] has certainly and
irrevocably parted with his 'possession or enjoyment.' " 1
Of course if the transferor has a reversionary interest of any type, lie
has not "certainly and irrevocably parted with his 'possession or en-
joyment.' " But the statute purports to tax not all "incomplete"
transfers but only those which become complete at or after the set-
tlor's death.
Somewhat later Mr. Justice Black says, with reference to the exemp-
tion urged on the ground of the retained interest's slight value:
"The question is not how much is the value of a reservation, but
whether after a trust transfer, considered by Congress to be a
potentially dangerous tax evasion transaction, some present or
contingent right or interest in the property still remains in the
settlor so that full and complete title, possession or enjoyment does
not absolutely pass to the beneficiaries until at or after the seillor's
death." 83
At this point Mr. Justice Black appears to agree with the Treasury
that the only relevance of a reversionary interest is that it may be a
method by which "full and complete title, possession or enjoyment" is
withheld from the beneficiaries until at or after the settlor's death.
But elsewhere, as in the other portions of his opinion quoted above, he
regards any reversionary interest as fair game for Section 811 (c).
One cannot escape the conviction that today's Court is as unwilling
as was yesterday's to stick to the statute and statutory purpose. If the
earlier Court was bemused by the concept of title, the later one is
bemused by the concepts of reversionary interest and of "complete"
transfers and by the metaphor of "strings." This is not to say that the
exchange of new shibboleths for old may not be a step forward. But
even the new are not to be found in the statute, nor do they spring
from extensive concern with the statutory purpose. The only signifi-
cance of a retention by the grantor of a "reversionary interest" or
other "string" or of his failure to make a "complete" transfer is that
these may be devices to prevent the transfer from taking effect in pos-
82. Ibid..
83. Id. at 707 (italics added).
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session or enjoyment until at or after his death. But if the grantor's
retention of a "reversionary interest" or "string" or his failure to make
a "complete" transfer are not devices to this end, Section 811(c) is
not applicable. The Treasury Regulations hew more closely to the
statute than do the dicta of the Supreme Court.
Is a rezzersionary interest vecessary? One more issue demands ex-
ploration. Spiegel's trust was to terminate upon his death. Even if he
had retained no reversionary interest to be cut off by his death, then,
that date was of importance to the beneficiaries. Not until then would
the corpus be distributed. Moreover, any child who was not alive on
that date forfeited his third of the corpus; it would go instead to the
deceased child's surviving children, if any, and otherwise to the set-
tlor's other children or their descendants. Was the transfer, by virtue
of these facts alone, intended by the settlor "to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death?"
In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.,"4 the Court had faced the same
question, viz., whether "the mere passing of possession or enjoyment
of the trust fund from the life tenants to the remaindermen after the
testator's death, as directed" was a taxable transfer.8 Thinking that a
tax would be "incongruous" and that it was "at least doubtful" that
the statute was intended to comprehend property not "passing from
the possession, enjoyment or control of the donor at his death," the
court decided to resolve the doubt in favor of the taxpayer and thereby
to avoid any constitutional question. Although later Courts have
developed an immunity to the constitutional "doubts" which afflicted
the Reinecke v. Nortlern Trust Co. Courtp the case has never been
overruled, and the Treasury Regulations have meticulously conformed
to it.S7 In directing reargument in the Spiegel and Church cases, how-
ever, the Court invited a discussion of its validity.l
The Government argued that Rehnecke v. N¥orthern Trust Co. was
wrongly decided. In its view a trust which terminates upon the set-
tlor's death is "a substitute for a testamentary disposition" and is both
84. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
85. One of the Reinecke v. Northen Trust Co. trusts provided, as did the Spicgcl
trust, that if a remainderman died before termination of the trust, his share of the corpus
would go not to his estate but to his surviving issue or to the settlor's issue. Transcript of
Record, p. 6, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). The other four trusts
provided that the share of such a predeceasing remainderman would go as he appointed
by will or, in default of appointment, to his or the settlor's surviving issue. Id. at 20, 23,
35, 43. The date of the testator's death is more crucial to the remaindermen under the
first trust than under the other four; in the latter cases the corpus will be paid to the
remainderman only if he survives that date, but he enjoys the power to route the corpus as
he desires even though he may not survive.
86. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938) ; see Eisenstein, supra note 5, at 497-
500.
87. See note 75 supra.
88. 68 S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1948).
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literally and in principle a transfer "intended 'to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after death.' " 9 On the oral argument
counsel for the Government urged also that there is no difference in
principle between a trust in which the settlor has retained a rever-
sionary interest of "trivial" value and one in which he reserved no
interest at all.9" Spiegel's executors asserted that Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co. was correctly decided because the federal estate tax, unlike
state inheritance taxes, is upon the "transfer of property from the
dead" and not upon the "succession to property by a beneficiary."
They also urged that the decision had been confirmed by Congress
and by other decisions of the Supreme Court.9
Since the Court decided to accept the determination by the court of
appeals that Spiegel had retained a reversionary interest in the trust
corpus, it found no need to answer the question which it directed
counsel to illuminate. In fact, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. is men-
tioned by Mr. Justice Black only in a footnote.9 2 But he does say in
both the Church and the Spiegel cases that a transfer to be exempt
under Section 811 (c) :
".... must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected by
whether the grantor lives or dies." 91
This statement suggests that even if a transfer is "immediate and out
and out" because the settlor has relinquished all his rights to the prop-
erty, it may nevertheless be taxable if it is "affected" by the grantor's
death. Then a trust would be taxable merely because it was to ter-
minate upon the grantor's death. If this is the meaning of Mr. Justice
Black's language, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. has been overruled
sub silentio by the Court.
Viewed in its context, however, the Justice's language may be less
sweeping than it appears at first glance. He goes on to say that his
prerequisites to a tax-free transfer were "declared . . . to be the
effect of the Hallock case in Goldstone v. United States." 91 In both,
the settlor had retained a reversionary interest which was extinguished
by his death. Neither involved a trust like that in Reinecke v. Northern
89. Brief for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on Reargument, p. 19, Splegel's
Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949) ; see also Eisenstein, .supra note 5, at 443-5,
90. Taxpayers' Petition for Rehearing, p. 13n.
91. Petitioners' Supplemental Brief on Reargument, pp. 12-6.
92. 335 U.S. 701, 706 n. 2. Although Mr. Justice Reed says: "We are asked to accept
an overruling ... I think, of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.," 335 U.S. 632, 652 (1949),
he apparently is referring to the contentions of counsel rather than to the opinion of the
court.
93. 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949) (italics added). The language is borrowed from Mr.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 547 (1927).
94. 335 U.S. 632, 646 (1949). The Goldstone case referred to is reported at 325 U.S.
687 (1945).
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Trust Co., where the settlor's death was only a dividing line which
shifted possession or enjoyment from the life beneficiaries to the re-
maindermen. Perhaps Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. should be over-
ruled,95 but if the Court intended to do so, it adopted a curious way to
convey the message. The proposed amendments to the Treasury
Regulations, announced as this goes to press, preserve as a condition
of taxability the requirement that the decedent have possessed some
right or interest in the property." Reinecke v. iortkern Trust Co. thus
lives on.
The place of the gift tax. It is curious that none of the opinions so much
as mentions the existence of the federal gift tax. It happens that the
Spiegel trust was created in 1920, before the enactment of the federal
gift tax statute; if the trust had not been brought under the estate tax,
the transfer would have escaped tax altogether. Aside from this cir-
cumstance, which will be of diminishing frequency in the future, the
real issue is whether such a trust shall be taxed as an inter vihos or as a
testamentary transfer. If the former, it will be subjected only to
federal gift tax. If the latter, a gift tax will have to be paid, but
in addition the transfer will be embraced by the estate tax, against
which the gift tax will be credited as a "down payment." ", Because
the gift tax is assessed at lower rates and affords a separate set of
exemptions and exclusions, the transfer which is reached only by it
escapes more cheaply than the transfer which falls under both taxes.
The Supreme Court's emphasis upon "complete" transfers may reflect
a view that the gift tax is so ineffective for these reasons that transfers
should be brought under the estate tax whenever possible. Were it not
for the lower rates and separate exemption and exclusions of the gift
tax, it would be of little importance whether the transfer were taxed as
an inter vivos or as a testamentary gift.
An integrated transfer tax-one way to avoid the overlapping which
results from the existing dual system of estate and gift taxes-would
be imposed only once. It would still be necessary to decide whether a
Spiegel transfer was taxable when the trust was created or only when
the settlor died. Though this would not be a matter of complete in-
difference to the taxpayer, it would be far less important than at
present." The integration proposal recently advanced by an advisory
committee of tax specialists in conjunction with Treasury officials
provides for a tax on the Spiegel and Hallock type transfer at death:
95. See Eisenstein, supra note 5. Of course, if a trust is to be taxed because the settlor
has retained a reversionary interest of trivial value, it is absurd to exempt Rcinecce '.
Northern Trust Co. trusts from tax. See notes 73 and 90 supra.
96. 14 FED. RE& 1824 (1949).
97. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943).
98. Under an integrated transfer tax, the rates would be the same whether the trans-
fer 'was taxed when made or not until the transferor's death. Unless there were an al-
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"A disposition of this type suspends the eventual disposition of
the property until the transferor's death and is, therefore, akin
to, as well as a substitute for, a testamentary disposition." 11
III. THE CHURCH CASE
The facts. The Church trust (created in 1924), unlike the Spiegel
trust, reserved the income to the settlor for life. On his death, the
corpus was to be distributed to his surviving issue; if no issue survived
him, the corpus was to go to his surviving brothers and sisters, the
children of any deceased brother or sister to take their parent's share
per stirpes. There was no express requirement that the children of
deceased brothers and sisters (i.e., the settlor's nieces and nephews)
survive the settlor to take. If such a condition was implicit, however,
the settlor had a reversionary interest "by operation of law," as in the
Spiegel case, since he made no provision for alternate takers if not only
his brothers and sisters, but also his nieces and nephews predeceased
him. If, however, the nieces and nephews were not required to survive
the settlor, then the share of those who predeceased him would pass to
their legatees or next of kin. When the trust was created the settlor
(who was unmarried) had six brothers and sisters and seven nieces and
nephews; the value of his reversionary interest, if he had one, is not
given. At the time of his death, he had no children of his own; he was
survived by his six brothers and sisters and by ten nieces and nephews.
The value, immediately before his death, of an opportunity to reacquire
the corpus of $188,800, by surviving the sixteen beneficiaries then
living, was less than $0.0003.11°
The Tax Court held that the settlor had a reversionary interest by
operation of law but that such an interest was not within the lIallock
doctrine.'' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, one judge dis-
senting, affirmed'on the Dobson principle, being unable to "identify a
clearcut mistake of law." 102 Whereas the court of appeals in the
lowance for interest, it would be advantageous to postpone liability until death. But a
counterbalancing factor would be the fact that the tax paid during life would reduce the
estate subject to tax at death. See ADvisoRY COMMiTTEE TO THE TmrASURY DE'PTMr.zqT
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES: A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND FOR CORRM TION
WITH THE IxcOmE TAX 14 (1947).
99. Id. at 31.
100. Transcript of Record, p. 13.
101. Estate of Church, CCH TC SERv., Dec. 14,287 (M) (1944). The Tax Court's
finding on this issue could have been more explicit, but the existence of a reversionary
interest is implicit in its statement: "Decedent [did not] expressly reserve any possibility
of reverter. The mere possibility of reverter by operation of law upon a failure of the trust,
due to the death of all the remaindermen prior to the death of decedent, is not such a possi-
bility as to come within the gallock case."
102. 161 F2d 11 (3rd Cir. 1947). In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501
(1943), the Court said: "Congress has invested the Tax Court with primary authority for
redetermining deficiencies, which constitutes the greater part of tax litigation. This re-
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Spiegel case had held that the settlor had a reversionary interest under
Illinois law, despite the Tax Court's view that he did not,10 3 the court
of appeals in the Church case made no determination of its own.
The overruling of May v. Heiner. If the Church case had been decided
simply on the basis of the alleged reversionary interest, as was the
Spiegel case, the Supreme Court would have had to face lseveral minor
questions left unanswered by Spiegel:
(1) May a court of appeals reexamine the Tax Court's determina-
tion of the law of a state outside the appellate court's orbit? 101 In the
Spiegel case the Tax Court held that the decedent "retained 'no string
or tie' amounting to a possibility of reversion." 105 The court of appeals
decided to the contrary.' Mr. Justice Black sanctioned the inde-
pendent determination of state law by the court of appeals and re-
fused to reexamine it. The Spiegel trust was governed by Illinois law
and the question of tax liability came before judges whose circuit in-
cludes Illinois and "who are constantly required to pass upon Illinois
law questions." 107 But the Church trust was governed by New York
law and the tax question was presented to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, whose jurisdiction does not extend to New York.
(2) If the court of appeals in the Church case was entitled to make
its own determination of state law, on the ground that it was as com-
petent to decide New York law as the Tax Court, would the Supreme
Court defer to its determination in the same manner as in the Spiegel
case it deferred to a determination by a court of appeals which included
the state whose law was controlling?
Instead of merely refining the learning of the Spiegel case, however,
the Supreme Court turned the Church case into a vehicle for overruling
quires it to consider both law and facts. Whatever latitude exists in resolving questions
such as those of proper accounting. . . exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular
courts; when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-
cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand." That the Dotson: rule re-
sulted in greater finality for the decisions of the Tax Court than for those of the district
court, see Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946). But see I=;?. Rxv.
CODE § 1141 (a), which became law on September 1, 1948. Is a determination by the Tax
Court of the law of a particular state a finding of fact, at least if the state is not 'within
the jurisdiction of the court of appeals which is reviewing the case?
103. CCH TC SERv., Dec. 14,424 (M) (1945).
104. In Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 164 (1942), cited by Mr. Justice Black in
the Spiegel case, the Court said: "Nor do we see any reason vnhy we should prefer the
view of the Board of Tax Appeals concerning Illinois law to that of the Circuit Court of
Appeals within which Illinois is embraced"
105. CCH TC StaR., Dec. 14,424 (M) (1945). Finding that the decedent had retained
no reversionary interest, the Court held the case controlled by Rcinccec v. Yorthcrn Trust
Co., supra, note 84.
106. 159 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1946).
107. 335 U.S. 701, 707-S (1949).
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May v. Heiner."°8 In that widely condemned decision,' handed down
in 1930, the Court had held that Section 811(c) did not reach a trust
by which the settlor had provided: income to her husband for life, on
his death income to herself for life, then remainders over. The decision
was followed within a year by three cases 110 involving the simpler
situation of ttusts under which the settlor had reserved the income for
his life, with remainders to others. These three cases were decided per
curiam against the United States on the authority of 2fay v. Teiner.
On the very next day, March 3, 1931, Congress repudiated the deci-
sions by Joint Resolution,'n ' but the Resolution later was held applica-
ble only to transfers made after the date of its enactment." 2 In com-
pliance with these decisions the Treasury Regulations, in effect at
Church's death and ever since, have provided that a transfer with life
estate reserved is embraced by Section 811(c) only if made after
March 3, 1931.113
May v. Heiner and the Hallock case. In killing off May v. Teiner, Mr.
Justice Black insisted that he was only carrying out a sentence pro-
nounced by the Court, albeit inaudibly, in the Hallock case:
" . . . [W]e there directly and unequivocally rejected the only
support that could possibly suffice for the holdings in May v. ll-
ner. That support was the Court's conclusion in May v. Heiner
that retention of possession or enjoyment of his property was not
enough to require inclusion of its value in the gross estate if a
trust grantor had succeeded in passing bare legal title out of him-
self before death." 114
Of course, in May v. Heiner the settlor had "succeeded" in disposing of
more than "bare legal title." She had not merely transferred ".bare
legal title" to a trustee, but had created remainder interests in the
corpus as well. And unlike the Hallock remainder, the May remainder
interests were not contingent upon the predecease of the grantor. The
necessary reach of the Hallock case was any transfer under which the
named remainderman must survive the settlor or forfeit the property.
It did not necessarily embrace the May transfer where the remainder-
man (or his estate) would take, come what may, with no possibility of
recapture of the corpus by the settlor.
108. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
109. See note 28 .spra.
110. Cases cited note 30 supra.
111. C. 454, 46 STAT.1516 (1931).
112. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
113. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18. The Court did not explicitly justify its imposition of
a tax in the teeth of the Regulations. But see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 n.8
(1940) : "Since the Treasury has amended its regulations in an effort to conform admin-
istrative practice to the compulsions of the St. Louis Trust Co. cases, it cannot be deemed
to have bound itself by this change."
114. 335 U.S. 632, 643-4 (1949).
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Nor was the language of the Hallock case, though sweeping, in neces-
sary conflict with lay v. Heiner. For the purpose of the Hallock Court
in using that language was to bring harmony into the welter of decisions
concerned with trusts in which the settlor had retained a reversionary
interest. The Klein case, decided in 1931, had held such trusts taxable
because "the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended
event which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee and
effected its transmission from the dead to the living." "I Then the
St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases "I had introduced distinctions based
on the common law of real property by which trusts resulting in identi-
cal reversionary interests would be taxed or immune depending upon
the "varying forms of words" 117 used in the trust instruments. The
Hallock case overruled the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, holding
that the "unwitty diversities of the law of property" should not control
the taxability of such transfers. The Hallock case, at half a dozen
places, purported to do no more than return to the Klein case by re-
jecting "as untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Union Trust
Co. cases in applying the Klein doctrine." uS As bearing upon the
Hallock Court's intention to destroy May v. Heier,"' it should be noted
115. 283 U.S. 231, 234 (1931).
116. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
117. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 114 (1940).
118. Id. at 122. Eisenstein argues, however, that the Klein case to which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said he was returning in the Hallock case was not the Klin case decided by
the Supreme Court in 1931. His view is that the Klein case can be reconciled with May v.
Heiner, which preceded it by a year, and with the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, which
followed it by a few years, only on the theory that "the Klcin decision hinged on the cir-
cumstance that a contingent remainder became a vested remainder." Eisenstein, sura note
5, at 452. This would lead, if I understand him correctly, to the conclusion that the Klcin
case ignored "the niceties of the art of conveyancing" only to a very limited e.tent, if at
all. It leads also to the conclusion that Mr. Justice Sutherland's description of the grantors
death as "the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being
for the grantee" was not intended to have the consequences attributed to it by Air. Justice
Frankfurter in the Hallock case. From this view of the Klein case it is argued that Hal-
lock is a new departure, fundamentally incompatible with May v. Heincr. It seems to fol-
low that, if in the Hallock case Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave too much credit to Mir. Jus-
tice Sutherland, in his dissent in the Church case he gives too little credit to his o,m
opinion in the Hallock case. I remain unpersuaded that the "dismal distinction," note 119
infra, is not a more likely, albeit less ingenious, explanation of w.,hat both Mir. Justice
Sutherland and Mr. Justice Frankfurter were up to in the Klein and Halloc cases. It has
the merit, at least, of taking them both at their word. In any event, the inquiry is now an
all but profitless one, except as indicating that after the Halloch case there was real doubt
of the continued vitality of May v. Heiner. This in turn sheds light on the reasonableness
of reliance upon that decision. See pp. 859-60 in!ra.
119. Though the May v. Heincr beneficiaries had to await the settlor's death to "come
into" the property, they or their estates-unlike the Klein, St. Lois U[nion Trust Co., and
Hallock beneficiaries-were certain of ultimate enjoyment. Something more than "niceties
of the art of conveyancing" marked the difference. To the effect that this is a "dismal dis-
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that the Klein case (to which the Iallock case announced a return) was
decided in April, 1931, a year after May v. Heiner and only a month
after it was reaffirmed by the three per curiam opinions. Presumably
the Court, in deciding the Klein case unanimously, thought the holding
consistent with the four cases decided, also unanimously, just a short
time before.
But the doctrine of iMfay v. Heiner, whether it was undermined by
Hallock or not, always rested upon the flimsiest of underpinnings. As
Mr. Justice Black points out, transfers with reserved life estates con-
sistently had been held to be embraced by the "possession or enjoy-
ment" clause of state death tax statutes, from which in 1916 the federal
statute had borrowed the clause. 2 ' Moreover, the Treasury's Regula-
tions had accepted this interpretation of the statute from 1919 on,121
and the Supreme Court in 1927 had assumed sub silentio that this con-
struction was correct.12 May v. Heiner immunized these transfers
from Section 811(c) only by applying a case not in point 123 and by
substituting in effect the word "title" for the sedulously chosen statu-
tory phrase "possession or enjoyment." Thus under May v. ieiner if
interests were created during life, they did not take effect in possession
or enjoyment at the settlor's death even though that was the event
which marked the boundary between anticipation and consummation.
Indeed, the dissenters in the Church case made no effort to defend
May v. Heiner on the merits, preferring to rest the case against its
repudiation on stare decisis and upon legislative approval of the deci-
sion.124
tinction" between May v. Heiner and the Hallock case, see Eisenstein, supra note 5, at
474 and 469. See also note 118 mupra.
120. See notes 25, 26 supra.
121. U.S. Treas. Reg. 37, art. 24 (1919).
122. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927). Two transfers were involved: (1) A
trust created in 1907, with a reserved life estate which was relinquished by the settlors in
1917. In holding that this trust was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to tax, tile
Court must have assumed, as did the court below, 4 F.2d 112 (D. Mass. 1925), that the
statute was intended to reach it. If the statute embraced a trust of this type, a foriori it
would have reached one in which the life estate was not relinquished. (2) A transfer of
two residences which the trial court held was absolute, with no retention of a life estate,
The lower court presumably stressed the failure of the settlor to reserve a life estate be-
cause it thought that such a reservation would have resulted in a tax. The Supreme Court
affirmed.
123. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929), which acknowledged, at
348, that Section 811(c) embraced property "passing from the possession, enjoyment or
control of the donor at his death. .. "
124. Mr. Justice Reed: 335 U.S. 632, 652 (1949) ; Mr. Justice Burton: id. at 696; Mr.
Justice Frankfurter: id. at 675. Mr. Justice Frankfurter presented a curious argument ad
hominem in support of the doctrine of May v. Heiner, saying: "These decisions [May v,
Heiner and the succeeding three per curian opinions], now cast aside, were shared in by
judges of whom it must be said without invidiousness that they were most alert in recog-
nizing the public interest and resourceful in protecting it. There were brave men before
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May v. Heiner and Congress. As to Congressional endorsement of
M1ay v. Heiner, Mr. Justice Black said:
"It would be impossible to say that Congress in 1931 intended to
accept and ratify decisions that hit the Congress like a 'bomb-
shell.' " 125
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, concluded that:
". IiThe subsequent actions of Congress make the meaning
announced in May v. Heiner and reaffirmed four times as much a
part of the wording of the statute as if it had been written in express
terms. An interpretation that'came like abombshell' certainlyhad
the attention of the Congress. Its failure to alter the language in-
dicates that it accepted that interpretation." 150
The actions of Congress which led Mr. Justice Frankfurter to his view
that it "accepted" the interpretation placed upon the statute by .May v.
Heiner may be conveniently discussed under three heads: the Joint
Resolution of March 3, 1931; the amendment of June 6, 1932; and the
subsequent reenactment of Section 81 1(c) as thus amended.
(1) The Joint Resolution of M1arch 3, 1931. Mfay v. Hdnzer was
decided on April 14, 1930. The Treasury Department did not imme-
Agamemnon." Cf. FANrFuRTEn, LAW AND POLITCS 55 (1939): "The courts threatened
the effectiveness of much of this legislation by technical and sterile definitions of 'posses-
sion or enjoyment,' and in 1931 Congress was forced to close a broad avenue of escape from
the estate tax' by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931.
125. 335 U.S. 632, 648 (1949).
126. 335 U.S. 632, 682 (1949). The Justice's comparison of the Hallocb and Church
cases to show that "[n]o comparable legislative history was flouted" in the former, id. at
683, is embodied in an interesting table. Not the least fascinating of its features is that
the two St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, note 116 supra, are counted as only one adjudica-
tion, while the three per cuiriant decisions of March 2, 1931, note 30 stpra, count as three.
And to treat Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), as an "adjudication" is dubious in the
extreme. Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that "fi]t is especially difficult to say that in Has-
sett v. Welch, supra, the Court considered only the language added by the joint resolution
and not the section in its entirety... " But one need only read beyond the first paragraph,
upon which the Justice relies, for indisputable evidence that the Court was concerned solely
with the retroactive application of the 1931 and 1932 amendments. That this would have
been an idle task if May v. Hcincr was wrong hardly converts the case into an "adjudica-
tion" of an issue not before the Court. More candid arithmetic, then, would indicate that
the St. Louis Union Trust Co. doctrine had been adjudicated once and the Play z. Hcincr
doctrine twice. We are also informed by the table that the 1931 "[c]hange [was] expressly
made prospective." Yet the Supreme Court in Hassett v. Welch, noting that the statute
e.-pressly was applicable to transfers made "at any time," thought its scope ,,as "involved
in sufficient ambiguity to warrant our seeking. .. aid" in the "settled" canon of con-
struction that "a law is presumed, in the absence of clear e.%pressioa to the contrary, to
operate prospectively." Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statements that the purpose of
Congress was "made manifest in a manner that leaves no doubt according to the ordnary
meaning of English speech" and that non-retroactivity is "the inescapable meaning of what
Congress did." 335 U.S. 632, 677, 678 (1949).
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diately urge Congress to repudiate the decision, possibly hoping that
the doctrine could be confined to the peculiar facts of that case: the
settlor had reserved only a "contingent" life estate. This distinction,
at any rate, was urged upon the Court by the Treasury in Burnet v.
Northern Trust Co., 121 where the settlor had a "direct" life estate. The
Treasury was finally galvanized into action when the Court decided
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co. and its two companion cases 128 on the
authority of May v. Heiner. On March 3, 1931-the day following
these three per curiam decisions and the day before Congress was
scheduled to adjourn-both houses passed and the President signed a
Joint Resolution requiring the inclusion in the gross estate of trans-
ferred property if:
".. . the transferor has retained for his life or any period not end-
ing before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the in-
come from, the property, or (2) the right to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from." 129
Despite Treasury argument to the contrary, it seems tolerably clear
(as the Court held in 1938) "0 that the Joint Resolution was intended to
operate only prospectively. Congress, then, failed to overrule Mfay v.
127. Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, pp. 20, 23-4, Burnet v. Northern
Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931): "The decision of this Court in May v. Hlcner supra, is
open to the interpretation that, looking at the terms of the irrevocable deed of trust in that
case, as of the time of its execution, under the provisions of which Mrs. May disposed of
the immediate right to possession or enjoyment, subject only to a possible reversionary
interest, and irrevocably disposed of the estate by title, it cannot be said that when she exe-
cuted this deed she intended that the transfer take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after her death, so that whether she predeceased Mr. May or not made no difference.
"Under that interpretation, that instant case is not affected by May v. Heiner." (p. 20)
"The above brief was prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
"Conclusion
"For the reasons set forth above, the gravest doubt as to the correctness of the deci-
sion below is entertained by the officials of the Treasury Department and their counsel.
While the Solicitor General and counsel, who have considered this decision in the De-
partment of Justice, do not share these doubts because of the decision of this Court in
May v. Heiner, supra, the importance and far-reaching effect of the decision below, not
only with respect to pending cases and trusts which have already been executed, but as
affording a method by which the payment of estate taxes can be avoided, are such as to
warrant consideration and final determination by this Court of the questions involved." In
all three cases the Government briefs argued that May v. Heiner was "clearly distinguish-
able." Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statements that in these cases "the Treasury invited
the Court's reconsideration of" May v. Heiner and that the Joint Resolution "was formu-
lated by the fiscal and legal expert who had that very day failed in persuading this Court
to overrule May v. Heiner." 335 U.S. 632, 675, 677 (1949).
128. Cases cited note 30 supra.
129. C. 454, 46 STAT. 1516 (1931).
130. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
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Heiner as to pre-1931 transfers. Does it follow that Congress endorsed
the decision so that, as to such transfers, it became (in the words of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter) "as much a part of the wording of the statute
as if it had been written in express terms"? 131
It must not be forgotten that on March 3, 1931, Congress lad only
one day left before its scheduled adjournment. At such a time a pro-
posal to tax transfers which hitherto had been thought immune could
not have gained a hearing. The speedy action of Congress and the
debate on the floor unequivocally demonstrate its conviction that the
Court had distorted the meaning of the statute. It is hard to believe
that by repudiating such a decision for the future, Congress was barring
reexamination by the Court as to the past.
Moreover, there is a more rational explanation of Congress' non-
retroactive action than the dubious theory that it was enacting into
law a doctrine of which it so emphatically disapproved. In Burnet T.
Northern Trust Co., as in its two companion cases, the Supreme Court
had significantly said that there was "no question of the constitutional
authority of the Congress to impose prospectively a tax with respect to
transfers or trusts of the sort here involved." 132 With such an ad-
visory opinion by the Supreme Court, prospective action by Congress
was certainly the better part of valor. The Court's remark also sheds
light on the statement in the House of Representatives by Mr. Gamer,
one of the sponsors of the Resolution:
"We did not make it retroactive for the reason that we were
afraid the Senate would not agree to it." 113
Why did he entertain fears that the Senate would not agree to retroac-
tive action? The rapid and unanimous action of the Senate-where
the Supreme Court's construction of the existing statute was de-
scribed as a "bombshell" '3 4-- shows unmistakably that the Senate
was no more friendly to the Court's view than was the House. It is a
131. 335 U.S. 632, 682 (1949).
132. 283 U.S. 782, 783 (1931). The specter of unconstitutionality may have been ex-
orcised by later decisions (cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 335 U.S. 632, 679 (1949)), but this
does not to any degree weaken the contemporary force of the Court's statement in 1931
that Congress could "prospectively" tax transfers with reserved life estates. The kmowl-
edge of 1938 was not vouchsafed to the Seventy-first Congress. The perils of unconstitu-
tionality were recognized by the very Treasury Decision which provided that the Joint
Resolution would not be retroactively applied: 'In view of the decisions of the Supreme
Court . . .the amendment . . . will, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 302(h)
[providing that unless "otherwise specifically provided" transfers were to be included
"whether . . .made before or after the enactment of this Act"] ...be applied prospcc-
tively only .. !' T.D. 4314, X-1 Cumr. BuLT_ 450 (1931). For the Treasury's contrary view
as to the force of the 1932 amendment, see note 140 infra.
133. 74 Cox. Rec. 7199 (1931).
134. Id. at 7078.
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reasonable inference that the Court's warning, rather than any desire
to give the Court's construction the force of law, would have stimulated
Senate disapproval of a retroactive measure. Reexamination of May v.
Heiner by the Court of course would not be susceptible to those con-
stitutional objections which might have inhibited a 1931 Congress
from acting on pre-1931 transfers.
The purpose of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 was "to stop
up this gap in the future" and to remove "this obvious opportunity for
tax avoidance." 135 There is not an iota of evidence that either the
House or the Senate wished to freeze May v. I-Heiner into law by for-
bidding the Court to repent its error.
(2) The amendment of June 6, 1932. During the discussion of the
Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, in the House of Representatives,
Mr. Garner had said:
"I have strong hopes that the next Congress will make it retro-
active." "3I
The "next Congress" (the Seventy-second) enacted the Revenue Act
of 1932, approved June 6, 1932,111 which amended Section 811(c) in
several respects.18 No action was taken, however, to fulfill the "hopes"
that had been expressed in the Seventy-first Congress. Why not? We
do not know. The Treasury did not ask for such action. Nor, so far
as the record shows, did anyone in Congress propose it. Since Congress
was not urged to repudiate May v. Heiner as to pre-1931 transfers, one
cannot say that its failure to act was an implicit approval of the deci-
sion. Possibly the warning against retroactive action contained in
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co. and its companion cases stood in the way
of any request by the Treasury for action.
(3) Reenactment of Section 8zx(c) by later Congresses. Though Sec-
tion 811(c)-as shaped by the Revenue Act of 1932-was reenacted in
later years, no steps were taken toward a statutory repudiation of
May v. Heiner as to pre-1931 transfers. But the Treasury did not
"remind any subsequent Congresses of this unfinished business" 3I
when it urged other changes in the estate tax. The motivation for its
failure is as obscure as the reason for the inaction of Congress.14 As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said so felicitously in the Hallock case:
135. Id. at 7199, 7078.
136. Id. at 7199.
137. 47 STAT. 169 (1932), INT. Rav. CoD& § 811(c).
138. For details, see pp. 867-70 infra. The Revenue Act of 1932 also amended Section
302(f), conforming the tax treatment of property passing under an inter tivos exercise by
the decedent of a general power of appointment to the treatment of his own property di.q-
posed of by ihtervivos transfer. 47 STAT. 279 (1932).
139. Mr. Justice Frankfurter: 335 U.S. 632, 681 (1949).
140. From 1934 to 1938, the Department took the view that the 1932 amendment ap-
plied to the pre-1932 transfers of persons dying after its enactment. U.S. Treas. Reg. 80,
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"Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy
might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and
of Congress but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective
legislation a controlling legal principle." 141
It is not possible to find "a controlling legal principle" in the failure of
the Seventy-second or later Congresses to repudiate fay v. Heiner as
to pre-1931 transfers. If any Congress ever made that decision "as
much a part of the wording of the statute as if it had been written in
express terms," 142 it must have been the Seventy-first, the only one
which considered the question. But that Congress refrained from
retroactive repudiation of 2itay v. t-einer, in my opinion, not because of
a desire to incorporate the decision into the statute, but because the
very Supreme Court which had decided the case had hinted that its
retroactive repudiation would be unconstitutional.
M1'ay v. Heiner and the doctrine of stare decisis. If May v. Heiner was
not written into the statute by the failure of Congress to write it out,
should it nevertheless be protected by the doctrine of stare decisis?
Here again there is the sharpest disagreement between Mr. Justice
Black and the dissenters; the contrasting views are best illustrated by
these excerpts from the opinions:
Mr. Justice Black: "In view of the struggle of the Treasury in
this tax field, the variant judicial and Tax Court opinions, our opin-
ion in the Hallock case and others which followed, it is not easy to
believe that taxpayers who executed trusts prior to the 1931 joint
art. 18(b) (1934). Until this view was authoritatively rejected in 1933 by Hassett v.
Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), the Treasury may have thought that there was no need for
further legislation. This construction of the statute was based upon Section 302(h), now
Section 811(h), which had provided since 1926 that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided" transfers were ta-able "whether made... before or after" the enactment of
this Act. Because of this provision, the Court in deciding Hasselt v. Vclfh said that "the
meaning of the section [811 (c)] is not so free from doubt as to preclude inquiry concern-
ing the legislative purpose" and also found "sufficient ambiguity to warrant" resort to
several canons of construction. Id. at 309, 314.
141. 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). To some extent, of course, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is
the victim of his own felicity. He might have said simply that Congressional inaction may
or may not be a neutral fact, depending on the circumstances. But having said that reliance
upon legislative inaction is to "walk on quicksand," as in the HalloeI case, or is too often
"the pursuit of a mirage," as in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942),
he can hardly object when his metaphors are turned against him in other cases where other
judges believe that there is no significance to the inaction. For a suggestion that his "re-
luctance" to upset erroneous decisions has "grown with the years," see Jaffe, The Audicial
Universe of 31r. Justice Franikfurter, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 357, 369 (1949). On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Black also has been willing on occasion to admit that Congress has
adopted a constricting Supreme Court decision by correcting only part of the evil it gen-
erated. Helvering v. Safe Deposit Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
142. 335 U.S. 632. 682 (1949).
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resolution felt secure in a belief that May v. Heiner gave them a
vested interest in protection from estate taxes under trust trans-
fers such as this one. . . . Certainly May v. teiner cannot be
granted the sanctuary of stare decisis on the ground that it has
had a long and tranquil history free from troubles and chal-
lenges." 143
Mr. Justice Burton: "After reliance by the Judicial, Legislative
and Executive branches of the Government for 18 years upon this
authoritative statutory construction, a reversal of it can be justi-
fied only by extraordinary circumstances. . . . The 1931 legis-
lation plus the passage of time would thus have disposed of May
v. Heiner without the injustices that will now arise from its re-
versal." 144
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "And even the judge who found May v.
Heiner inconsistent with the Hallock case suggested that the Tax
Court determine whether the grantor failed to relinquish his life
estate in reliance upon May v. Heiner. . . . The Government at
the bar of this Court suggested that hardships could be alleviated
by a regulation relieving of a tax those estates which could show
such reliance. The very suggestion involved a confession that
the decision urged upon the Court would be unfair." 145
Mr. Justice Reed: "In reliance upon a long settled course of
legislative and judicial construction, donors have made property
arrangements that should not now be upset summarily with no
stronger reasons for doing so than that former courts and the
Congress did not interpret the legislation in the same way as this
Court now does." 146
An appraisal of these opposing views of the settled expectations of
taxpayers is more than a post-mortem on May v. Heiner. The American
Bar Association's House of Delegates- adopted a resolution at its 1949
Mid-Year Meeting recommending "a return to the doctrine of M ray v.
Heiner by Congressional action." 14 No doubt the statements in the
143. Id. at 647-8.
144. Id. at 699.
145. Id. at 685 n. 14. See note 174 infra.
146. Id. at 652-3 (1949).
147. 35 A.B.A.J. 251 (1949). The resolution is so described, although it does not refer
to May v. Heiner by name. The writer is informed that the original draft was unacceptable
to the Council of the Association's Committee on Federal Estate and Gift Taxation because
a specific mention of May v. Heiner might have been thought an approval of that decision.
As redrafted and unanimously adopted by the Council of the Committee, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Association, and the House of Delegates of the Association, the resolution
is as follows:
"RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends to the Congress that
it make clear that its purpose in enacting the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 STAT.
1516) was to provide that the Joint Resolution should apply only to transfers made after
its enactment, and that as to any transfer made prior to March 3, 1931, the mere reten-
tion by the transferor of a life estate shall not in itself cause the transfer to be taxable
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dissenting opinions in the Church case will be the springboard for this
recommendation to Congress. Moreover, as this article goes to press,
the Commissioner has proposed to amend the Regulations to provide
that the doctrine of the Church case will not be applied to estates whose
decedents died on or before January 17, 1949, the date of the deci-
sion.'4 These proposals for administrative and legislative action
should evoke a critical analysis of the extent to which there may have
been reasonable reliance upon "the doctrine of Lay v. Heiner." 1
Until M1,ay v. Heiner was decided, of course, no well-advised taxpayer
would have thought that property transferred with life estate reserved
was beyond the reach of the federal estate tax. So far as pre-1930 legal
thought was concerned, if the phrase "intended to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment at or after death" included anything, it included
such transfers.15 It may be that some students of the Supreme Court
predicted the outcome in M1ay v. Heiner-certainly taxpayers were
litigating the issue- 5' but anyone who relied on such a prediction
was gambling rather than indulging "reasonable expectations" of the
kind which may be entitled to public protection.
How did the decision in M1'ay v. Heiner (and in the three later cases)
alter the situation? The dissenting justices assert, in effect, that once
the shadow of the estate tax was dispelled by May v. Heincr, taxpayers
accommodated themselves to a new life and acted after z93o in reliance
upon the integrity of that decision. Their reliance, in other words, was
that they refrained from relinquishing the reserved life estates. The
silent premise is that if May v. Heiner had been decided the other way,
taxpayers would have relinquished their life estates. This premise,
in turn, brings us to a disturbing question: If a grantor was content in
under the provisions of Section 811(c) as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death; and
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Association proposes that this result h
achieved by the passage by Congress of a Joint Resolution expressing such intention; and
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Officers and Council of the Section of
Taxation are directed to urge the following Joint Resolution, or its equivalent in purpose
and effect, upon the proper committees of Congress:
"'The amendment made by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 STAT. 1516) to
Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 and reenacted as Section C03(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1932 and Section 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code is not applicable to trans-
fers made prior to March 3, 1931; and that as to any transfer made prior to March 3, 1931,
the mere retention by the transferor of a life estate shall not in itself cause the transfer to
be taxable under the provisions of Section 811 (c) as a transfer to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death?"
148. 14 FFD. REG. 1824 (1949).
149. As elsewhere, this reference to May v. Hciner is intended to embrace also the three
per curiam decisions, note 30 supra, which reaffirmed May v. Hcincr.
150. See note 25 supra.
151. Besides May v. Hcincr and the three 1931 cases, note 30 supra, there were Frew v.
Bowers, 12 F2d 625 (2d Cir. 1926) and Levy v. Wardell, 258 U.S. 542 (1922), though the
latter two cases involved pre-1916 transfers.
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the 1920's to invite the estate tax by reserving a life estate, why would
he have relinquished it if the Court ip 1930 had confirmed his expecta-
tions? Put another way: If the reserved life estate was worth the estate
tax price in 1920, why wasn't it worth that price after 1930?
Presumably the answer is that the tax price went up,1" 2 while the
actuarial value of the life estate to the settlor was going down. The
estate tax rates have risen substantially since May v. HUeiner was de-
cided, and a liability that was viewed with equanimity in 1920 may
have mounted to an alarming degree since then. 53 Yet it would be
fatuous to assume that an increase in potential estate tax liability
would inevitably have been followed by a relinquishment of the life
estate. In some cases the income may have been the settlor's chief or
only means of support. Moreover, whether the income was essential
or not, many settlors of such trusts must have foreseen an increase in
liability as their estates increased in value during the late twenties.
The failure to relinquish the life estate at that time demonstrates that
not every increase in estate tax makes retention of a life estate too ex-
pensive. And the spectacular increases in income tax rates in the last
two decades were surely a goad to tax-conscious grantors to relinquish
life estates so the income would be taxed to others, almost invariably
in lower tax brackets. If soaring income tax rates did not result in
relinquishment, why assume that increased estate tax liability would
have turned the trick?
These doubts arise because taxpayers are not calculating machines
but human beings; every tax action is not accompanied by an equal
and opposite taxpayer reaction. Despite these doubts, however, let us
assume with the dissenters in the Church case that at least some set-
tlors who thought a reserved life estate worth the price before 1930
would not have thought so thereafter and that, except for May v.
Heiner, they would have relinquished the life estate in order to escape
the tax liability.
We must still ask: was it reasonable to refrain from relinquishing a
life estate in reliance upon May v. Heiner? Unless the reliance was
152. Brief for Neeves & Durbin as Amici Curiae on Certain Limited Points, p. 14, Com-
missioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949) : "Assuming that the settlor in legal
contemplation assumed the risk of the tax, the estate tax in the 1920's was only a token
tax by present standards and was used principally to induce the states to adopt inheritance
tax statutes. The rates were trivial by present standards. The size of the tax as well ag
its philosophy was so changed in the 1930's as to make it in effect a new tax designed to
take for the Government the greater part of substantial estates and a large part of modest
ones. Settlors in the 1920's were not on notice and could not have expected the enact-
ment of such a new tax and its application to their transfers."
153. Actually, of course, the tax liability depends on the vicissitudes of the settlor's
fortune as well as on the tax rate. The liability may have decreased despite the increases
in rates.
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reasonable, no "just expectations" are defeated by the overruling of
Hay v. Heiner. Did that decision, then, justifiably paralyze action?
The Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 undid the work of May v.
Heiner as to transfers consummated after its enactment."' Could a
settlor have felt secure in the belief that this legislation, as amended in
1932,155 did not also reach pre-1931 transfers? The Treasury Regula-
tions would have warned him against this belief: from 1934 on they
consistently provided that Section 803 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1932
embraced pre-1931 transfers.1"' Several lower courts accepted the
Treasury's interpretation of the statute.5 7 Not until the Supreme
Court decided Hassett v. Welch on February 28, 1938 was there an
authoritative determination that Congress had not repudiated M2ay v.
Heiner as to transfers consummated before, as well as after, March 3,
1931.
A settlor who refrained from relinquishing a life estate during the
period 1931-1938 because of M1ay v. Heiner, then, was gambling rather
than merely relying upon settled law. After Hassett v. Welch, of course,
he was justified in the belief that the immunity which M1ay v. Hehier
conferred on his transferred property had not been cancelled by Con-
gress. It follows that the only "settled expectations" which are proper
candidates for protection are those which arose after February 28,
1938.
Moreover, any such expectations should have been weakened if not
altogether dispelled by the Hallock case, t-' 3 decided on January 29,
1940. Not that the Hallock case was irreconcilable with May v. Heiner;
to the contrary, as argued above,19 Hallock can be distinguished both
in fact and in principle. But judges as divergent in outlook as Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts and Judge Jerome Frank thought May v. Heiner had been
repudiated by Hallock, and so did an eminent commentator."' The
154. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
155. 47 STAT.279 (1932), Ii. REv. CODa§811(C).
156. See note 140 supra. The Regulations provided, hovever, that the Joint Resolution
of March 3, 1931 (applicable only to persons dying on or before June 5, 1932, the date of
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1932) did not apply to pre-1931 transfers. See note 132
mtpra.
157. Hassett v. Velch, 90 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937) revzd, 303 U.S. 303 (193S) ; Smith
v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mass. 1936) ; Myers v. Magruder, 15 F.Supp. 4S.3
(D. Md. 1936). All held that the statute embraced pre-1931 transfers, but that the attempt
to do so was unconstitutional.
158. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
159. Supra pp. 848-50.
160. Justices Roberts and McReynolds, dissenting in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 123 (1940); Judge Frank, dissenting in Helvering v. Proctor, 140 F2d 87, S9 (2d
Cir. 1944), and dissenting in Commissioner v. Estate of Hall, 153 F2d 172, 174 (2d Cir.
1946) ; 1 PAur, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TA-:ATio. § 7.15 (1942). See also Estate of
Hughes, 44 B.T.A. 1196 (1941), ovcrrulcd by Estate of Bradley, 1 T.C. 518 (1943), aff'd
sub ,on. Helvering v. Washington Trust Co., 140 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Commissioner attacked May v. Heiner shortly after Hallock was won,
and continued to snipe at it intermittently thereafter,"' A settlor
who was ready to relinquish his life estate unless tax immunity was
assured must have been wracked by doubt after the .Iallock case. If
he retained his life estate, it was because he (or his counsel) had de-
cided to rest upon his guess as to the Court's probable conduct. The
Church case shows that his guess was wrong-as Mr. Justice Roberts
and others had foretold. Action to reinstate May v. Heiner can hardly
be demanded on the ground that his expectations have been defeated,
unless any wrong guess is to work an "estoppel" merely because it
might have been right. In this view, the only estates which can prop-
erly ask for reinstatement of May v. Heiner are those whose decedents
died after February 28, 1938 (Hassett v. Welch) and before January 29,
1940 (Helvering v. Hallock).62
Perhaps too much prescience is demanded of taxpayers by the sug-
gestion that reliance upon May v. Heiner should have terminated with
the Hallock case. Possibly a settlor who was convinced in 1938 by
Hassett v. Welch that his pre-1931 trust was immune could reasonably
have indulged that conviction even after the Hallock decision. Even
so, the question asked somewhat earlier must be rephrased: If the re-
served life estate was worth the price until 1938, what is the basis for
assuming that the settlor would have relinquished it as not worth the
price after February 28, 1938? A similar answer can be made: the
price may have gone up. But the periods for comparison are now
different, and, of course, it is less likely that the price did in fact rise.
And here again it should be noted that retention of a life estate until
1938 in the face of stiff rises in income tax rates indicates that the
grantor was not primarily concerned with tax liability. Any request
for Congressional action ought to be accompanied by evidence that a
substantial number of settlors found themselves in such changed cir-
cumstances after z938 that-but for May v. Heiner-they would have
relinquished their life estates. One or two such cases do not justify
general "relief." 163
161. Estate of Hughes, supra note 160; Helvering v. Proctor, supra note 160; Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Hall, supra note 160. The Proctor case was represented to the court of
appeals as a "test case," Commissioner v. Estate of Hall, supra, at 174, but the United
States did not surrender with its loss. In view of the Commissioner's attacks upon May v.
Heiner, the formal acceptance of that decision by the Regulations could not have misled
settlors to think that reliance upon it was safe.
162. In this view, the decedent in the Church case could reasonably have relied on a
freedom from tax only during the period from February 28, 1938, when Hassett v. Welch
was decided, to December 11, 1939, when he died.
163. There is one class of trusts which at first blush have a special case for relief. They
are trusts (with reserved life estates) created after April 14, 1930, when May v. Hiner
was decided, and before March 3, 1931, when the Joint Resolution became effective. It
may be argued that these trusts, unlike transfers before May v. Hdner, were created in
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The likelihood that many persons would have taken such action is
diminished by two additional facts of importance. First, the relin-
quishment would have been a taxable gift. The grantor would have
had to weigh the ultimate estate tax saving against the immediate
gift tax liability. It must be assumed that the gift tax liability would
have been a restraining influence of some weight. We know that the
extent to which taxpayers make inter vivos gifts and thereby reduce
their estate tax liability is far less than mathematics alone would
dictate.164
Second, since by hypothesis the sole motivation for a relinquishment
of the type we are considering is the avoidance of estate tax on the
corpus, the relinquishment would be a gift in contemplation of death.' 5
reliance on an authoritative decision of the Court that the transferred property would be
free from estate tax, and that their settlors are not trying to preserve a windfall. But was
it quite clear in the period between April 14, 1930 and March 3, 1931 that the Court would
treat trusts with income reserved for the settlor's life in the same manner, as, in May v.
Heihwr, it treated trusts with income to a beneficiary for life and thcn to the settlor for
life? The Treasury, at least, urged that the case of "direct" life estates could be distin-
guished, note 127 supra, and had enough faith in the position to leave its regulations un-
changed and to postpone a request for Congressional aid until that case -as decided. And
even if such settlors did reasonably find the germ of Buret %,. Yorlhen; Trust Co. in May
v. Heiner, after 1931 they had the same warnings as pre-1930 settlors that their trusts
might be unsafe: the possible retroactivity of the Joint Resolution; the uncertain scope of
the Hallock case. If they manted insurance against the estate tax, then, they had reason to
reconsider their action. The failure to relinquish the life estates, especially under the im-
pact of an increased income tax, suggests that they too retained their life estates because
the income from the trust property was worth its possible estate tax price.
164. Victory, AGENDA Foa PRoaEssrvE TAxArioN 205 (1947).
165. The statute requires the inclusion of "the value at the time of [the decedent's]
death of all property . . . [to] the e.\-tent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer. . . in contemplation of... death." INT. REV. COD2
§ 811 (c). A literal application of these words would result in no tax, since the life estate
is extinguished by the decedent's death. (Note that interests retained by the decedent which
lapse upon death are not included in the gross estate.) The phrase "at the time of his death"
might be construed to mean "immediately before his death," in which event the includible
value of the life estate would be computed with regard to the decedent's life expectancy
at that time. On either theory other types of property of limited life, such as copyrights,
patents, leases, oil royalties, etc., would be taxed, if at all, at values below their worth at
the time of transfer. The other extreme would be to tax the entire corpus, the life estate
in which was released in contemplation of death. This procedure finds some support in
the theory that the tax is to be computed "as if" the transfer had not occurred, Igleheart v.
Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935), see Note, 58 YAmm L.J. 313 (1949). But it is
one thing to hold that the transfer is to be disregarded so as to treat the transferred in-
terest as though it had been retained until death, thus permitting fluctuations in the value
of the transferred property to be reflected in the gross estate. It is quite another thing to
say that the transfer is to be ignored in order to treat other property as though the in-
terest transferred in contemplation of death had been retained. But ef. Estate of Sullivan,
10 T.C. 961 (1948), 37 CA~i.. L. Rnv. 134 (1949). Section 811(j) suggests a pozsible
though perhaps illogical way out of the dilemma: take into account all fluctuations in the
value of the transferred interest between the date of transfer and the date of death ex'cept
those resulting from mere lapse of time. Thus on the release of a life estate, the value to
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In Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia,16 the Supreme Court held that
the relinquishment of a power to amend a trust (the retention of which
would have brought the corpus into the settlor's taxable estate) in
order to avoid the estate tax was not a gift in contemplation of death.
But there the purpose of the original transfers in trust was to take care
of the beneficiaries "come what may," "by giving them property,
freed of all claims, tax or otherwise." This purpose would have been
thwarted if the corpus was included in the grantor's estate and sub-
jected to the estate tax lien. The original transfer had been thought by
the settlor to achieve this purpose-a reasonable expectation later
proved incorrect by the Supreme Court- 107 and the subsequent re-
linquishment was intended by the grantor "to put the trusts in the
condition he had thought they were in when he made them."
But the.Georgia Trust Co. case would be cold comfort to a settlor who
had created a trust before 1931, retaining the income for life. Since he
was willing to court an estate tax at the time of the original transfer,
a later relinquishment of the life estate would not be designed to insure
the success of an original plan of providing the beneficiaries with assets
free of any possible tax claims. In relinquishing his retained rights,
such a grantor, unlike the testator in the Georgia Trust Co. case, would
not be endeavoring "merely to accomplish by an additional step what
he assumed he had already done." ,,a The relinquishment of a life es-
tate, therefore, would have constituted a gift in contemplation of
death. This reduces still further the likelihood that a settlor would
have relinquished-but for May v. Heiner-his life estate.
For these reasons, the Treasury's proposal lOS to jettison the Church
case for decedents who died before January 17, 1949 is unwise. The
case for "relief" is yet to be established. It is true that many estates
which enjoyed the benefits of May v. Heiner have been closed, and that
similar benefits would be denied to "those that are still open merely
because of the' fortuitous circumstance that the settlor in estates now
open deferred his death [!] until the last few years and after Hallock
be included in the gross estate would be the actuarial value at the date of release, with
adjustments for changes in the earning power of the property between that date and the
date of death. In any event, the uncertainties of this question of valuation cast doubt on the
glib assertion that settlors would have hastened to relinquish life estates had it not been
for May v. Heiner. And the valuation question is no more uncertain now than in earlier
years.
166. 326 U.S. 630 (1946).
167. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
167a. The settlor of a trust created between April 14, 1930 and March 3, 1931 might be
able to establish that his original plan was to provide for his beneficiaries "by giving them
property, freed of all claims, tax or otherwise," note 166 supra, and that a later relinquish-
ment was intended "merely to accomplish by an additional step what he assumed he had al-
ready done." But see note 163 supra.
168. 14 Fm. REa. 1824 (1949).
[Vol. 58: 825
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 862 1948-1949
THE CHURCH AND SPIEGEL CASES
was decided." 169 But such discrimination is the inevitable concomitant
of the statute of limitations; it can be avoided only by writing into the
Internal Revenue Code a most favored nation clause so that every
lenient construction of the statute will redound to the benefit of all
later taxpayers. It should not be overlooked that innumerable pre-
1931 estates paid taxes on transfers like Church's. Did the American
Bar Association in 1931 propose the retroactive overruling of Mllay v.
Heiner so as to place post-1931 estates on a par with pre-1931 estates?
An ironical aspect of the Treasury proposal is that an estate whose
decedent, forseeing the demise of M1ray v. Heiner, relinquished his life
estate and paid a gift tax will be placed in a position less favorable
than an estate whose decedent did not consider the matter, or decided
to take a chance, or made a false forecast.""0
Even disregarding all of the foregoing considerations, there is no
justification for the American Bar Association's proposal to exempt
trusts whose settlors are still living. Assume, that is, that it was a
certainty in 1931 that the Joint Resolution was prospective only and'
hence left their trusts untouched. Assume also that the Halloch case
was not a warning that M1ay v. Heiner might fall. The fact remains
that a living settlor may still release his life estate. But, it will be as-
serted, he could have done so free of gift tax before June 1, 1932 and
that he would have done so had it not been for May v. Heiner. But is
there a rational foundation for the latter assertion? If he retained the
life estate until May v. Heiner, in the face of an almost certain estate
tax, why is it likely that he would have relinquished his life estate
immediately if the Court had gone the other way? The estate tax rates
did not rise until 1932; this might have prompted a relinquishment,
but by then a gift tax would have been imposed on the transfer. And
later increases in the gift tax rates are probably counterbalanced by
reduction in the actuarial value of the life estate to be relinquished.
In any event, the assertion that there would have been a tax-free
release before 1932 calls only for relief from the imposition of gift tax:
upon a release of the life estate. Such relief would restore the settlor
to his 1930 or 1931 position. But relief from thegift taxisnot really of im-
portance. A release will be a gift in contemplation of death resulting
in an increased estate tax,'7 ' against which a gift tax paid will be
credited as a "dowrn payment." 172 Relief from the gift tax will only
postpone the inevitable. A release in 1930 or 1931 would have saved
169. Brief of Amid Curiae on Certain Limited Points, p. 11, Commissioner v. Churchs
Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
170. Though the gift tax paid may be credited against the estate tax ultimately payable,
the credit may not be the full amount of the gift tax, and since there is no allovance for
interest the decedent will have been deprived of the use of the money during his life.
171. See note 165 supra.
172. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). See note 170 supra.
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a gift tax; it would not have saved the transfer from estate tax on the
gift in contemplation of death. A release today will be subject to gift
tax, which, however, will be applicable against the estate tax. It is
hard to see how a living settlor has been handicapped by the Supreme
Court's delay in properly interpreting the statute.
Throughout the foregoing it has been assumed that if a substantial
number of taxpayers have acted in reliance upon the doctrine of May
v. Heiner, they should be protected against an overruling of that
decision. Yet Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself has admonished us
against concluding "that the inevitably empiric process of construing
tax legislation should give rise to an estoppel against the responsible
exercise of the judicial process." 113 The Iallock case rejected such an
estoppel, though the Treasury Department thereafter declined to
take full advantage of its victory. 7 4 Only in the most formal sense
can the courts, the administrators, or the legislature eschew retroac-
tivity; every economic decision by a taxpayer today may have con-
sequences-by virtue of legislation or decisions as yet uncontemplated
-which are not and cannot be foreseen. Perhaps a taxpayer who
thought his pre-1931 trust immune under May v. Ileiner retired from
business in the expectation that his family would receive the remainder
free of tax claims. Is he different from a person who retired before
1916, after accumulating a fund for his family, because he did not
foresee the federal estate tax, or from one who retired before 1932 be-
cause he anticipated no increase in estate tax rates? If the rates can be
increased, though the change nullifies the most careful planning by a
taxpayer, of what use to acknowledge a vested interest in but one
segment of his plan?
IV. THE NEW SCOPE OF THE "POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT" CLAUSE,
The overruling of May v. Heiner opens a new area of statutory con-
struction. We now know that a pre-1931 transfer with reserved life
estate is "a transfer ... intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after .. .death." But what of a reservation of income
173. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
174. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1946), provides that a transfer made between Novem-
ber 11, 1935 (the date of the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, note 116 supra) and January
29, 1940 (the date they were overruled by the Hallock case) is not taxable if the Commis-
sioner decides it was patterned on the St. Louis Union Trust Co. model and if the settlor
reported it in full as a completed gift. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was willing to overrule the
St. Louis Union. Trast Co. cases despite the asserted unfairness of doing so. Yet curiously,
in the Church case he cited the Treasury suggestion for limiting retroactive application of
the decision as a confession that it would be unfair to overrule May v. Heiner, 335 U.S.
632, 677 et seq. (1949). In urging that the overruling of the St. Louis Union Trust Co.
cases by Hallock was distinguishable, he did not mention this Treasury Regulation, though
it is a much more formal "confession" of unfairness than counsel's "suggestion" in the
course of oral argument in the Church case.
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for a period to end six months before the decedent's death? A reserva-
tion for X years, a period which corresponds to the grantor's life
expectancy? A reservation of the right-alone or in concert with
another person-to designate the recipient of the income? These
variations are all specifically covered by the 1931 and 1932 amend-
ments to Section 811(c), but only with respect to transfers made there-
after. But does the "possession or enjoyment" clause of Section 811(c),
now liberated by the Chzirch case from thralldom to M11ay v. Heiner,
cover the same ground as the 1931 and 1932 amendments, so that even
pre-1931 transfers of these types are now taxable?
The Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 i7 added to Section 811(c)
these words:
".. . including a transfer under which the transferor has re-
tained for his life or any period not ending before his death (1)
the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property
or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess or en-
joy the property or the income therefrom . . . "
The circumstances of the Joint Resolution's adoption by Congress
demonstrate, as urged above,176 that it embraced only those transfers
which Congress had thought were already included in the "possession
or enjoyment" clause. The legislative committees later said that "the
joint resolution was designed to avoid the effect of decisions of the
Supreme Court . . ." '7 The proliferation of language in the Joint
Resolution, then, was a response to the unwillingness of the Supreme
Court to harken to simple phraseology, not an attempt to say some-
thing new. It follows that a type of transfer which would be compre-
hended by the Joint Resolution if made after 1931, would be reached
by the original "possession or enjoyment" clause, if made before 1931.
In the Joint Resolution Congress specified that a retention of the
right to designate the recipient of income should have the same tax
price as a retention of the income. This, it would seem, was only a
statement of the obvious: the economic position of one who can name
the income beneficiary is all but indistinguishable from the position
of one who has reserved the income to himself. Specification in the
Joint Resolution of this fact of life confirms-rather than denies-
that the pre-1931 statute reached a reservation of the power to desig-
nate.
Yet the issue is not one of first impression. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has said that "it is clear that a pre-1931 reserved
power to designate who should enjoy the income was not sufficient to
throw the entire corpus into the gross estate." 178 The court is correct,
175. C. 454,46 STAT. 1516 (1931).
176. Supra pp. 851-53.
177. 1939-1 Cum. BuLu. (Part 2) 490, 532.
178. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner. 165 F2d 14, 146 (1st Cir. 1947).
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but only because such a power was regarded as in the same category
as the reserved life estate and hence governed by May v. Heiner.'"
Although two of the three cases "0 which shocked Congress into passing
the Joint Resolution involved reserved life estates, the third 181 in-
volved a reserved power to designate the income beneficiary. The
Treasury Department, Supreme Court, and Congress treated the
three cases as involving the same principle, further evidence that a
power to designate the recipient of income is in substance the same as
a reserved life estate. 182
The other differences in phraseology between the "possession or
enjoyment" clause and the Joint Resolution are more minor. The
Joint Resolution applies to a retention by the settlor "for his life or any
period not ending before his death." 1s1 It also applies to a reserva-
tion of "the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the prop-
erty." But since the Joint Resolution was intended to correct a mis-
interpretation of an existing statute, not to reach out to transfers
hitherto thought immune, these phrases are no broader in scope than
the pre-1931 statute. With the overruling of May v. Heiner, the "pos-
session or enjoyment" clause is sufficient to reach all transfers com-
prehended by the Joint Resolution. March 3, 1931 is no longer a date
to conjure with.
The proposed amendments to the Treasury Regulations,184 however,
are unfortunately vague, needlessly suggesting a continued dichotomy
between pre-1931 and post-1931 transfers. Pre-1931 transfers will be
taxed-under the proposal-if the settlor retained "[a] right to the
179. The two cases cited by the Court, supra note 178, in support of the quoted state-
ment hold merely that if a pre-1931 reserved life estate does not (under May v. Rehler)
bring the corpus into the gross estate, a reserved power to designate the income beneficiary
is equally ineffective. Neither opinion intimated that a power to designate the income
beneficiary would be exempt if a reserved life estate resulted in tax.
180. See note 30 supra.
181. McCormickv. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
182. What of a power to designate only within a restricted class? The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit has refused in a persuasive passage to distinguish a power to
designate within a restricted class from an unrestricted power to designate: "It would be a
relatively simple matter to put in the instrument a list of persons which would cover prac-
tically anyone that the decedent might ever wish to designate." Industrial Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1947). This consideration would seem also to
bar a distinction between a life estate and a restricted power to designate.
183. If a youthful settlor reserved the income for five years and died within the period,
the reservation would fit the literal requirement of the statute: ". . . a transfer . . . for
.. any period not ending before his death." But the Regulations reach only a transfer
for life or "for such a period as to evidence [the decedent's] intention that it should extend
at least for the duration of his life and his death occurs before the expiration of such
period." U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18(a) ; see also id., § 81.19(a). The settlor, then, must
intend his reserved right to be effective at least throughout his life.
184. 14 FED. REa. 1824 (1949).
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possession or enjoyment of the property or a right to the income there-
from."'But the Regulations continue to provide in separate sections
that post-1931 transfers will be taxed if the settlor retained either
"the use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the
transferred property" Is' or "the right . . . to designate the person
or persons who shall possess or enjoy the transferred property, or the
income thereof." 16 Do the proposed amendments mean that pre-1931
transfers will not be taxed if the settlor has retained only the right to
designate the income beneficiary?
There remain for consideration the changes in Section 811 (c) wrought
by the 1932 amendment,s 7 which replaced the Joint Resolution. This
amendment taxes property of which the decedent:
"... has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertain-
able without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income, from the property, or (2) the right,
either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom."
To the extent that the 1932 amendment was declaratory, its scope is
prefigured by the Joint Resolution and hence by the terser pre-1931
language. Changes of substance, however, mark a departure from the
pre-1931 clause and (since the 1932 amendments were not retroac-
tive) "I will preserve the vitality of 5 p.m., Eastern Standard Time,
June 6. 1932, as a dividing line.
The committee reports on the 1932 amendment state that several of
the changes were "to clarify" the Joint Resolution but that: "[Clertain
new matter has also been added, which is without retroactive effect." s
The reports explicitly stamp two of the changes as "clarifying:"
"(2) The insertion of the words 'or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death,' which is to reach, for example, a
transfer where decedent, 70 years old, reserves the income for an
extended term of years and dies during the term, or where he is to
have the income from and after the death of another person until
his own death, and such other person predeceases him. This is a
clarifying change and does not represent new matter.
"(3) The insertion of the words 'the right to the income' in place
of the words 'the income' is designed to reach a case where decedent
had the right to the income, though he did not actually receive it.
This is also a clarifying change." 1.0
185. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18.
186. Id., § 81.19.
187. 47STT.279 (1932).
188. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
189. 1939-1 Cur. Buu. (Part 2) 490, 532.
190. Ibid.
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Paragraph (2) of this report presents a curious problem. It provides
that a transfer is taxable if the settlor retains a life estate contingent
upon the death of another person and "such other person predeceases
him." This is the case of a "contingent" life estate-the very provision
involved in May v. Heiner.9' One surely would have thought that the
repudiation of May v. Heiner was complete, whether or not the pre-
ceding life tenant had predeceased the settlor. The Court in deciding
the case indicated that, although the settlor '"apparently" did not
survive the life beneficiary, the question was irrelevant. Yet the re-
ports on the 1932 amendment suggest that a transfer with contingent
life estate is taxable only if the preceding life tenant predeceases the
settlor.
The qualification ("and such other person predeceases him") in
paragraph (2) was at one time regarded as essential to imposition of
the tax by the Treasury Department, presumably because of this
statement in the reports, and the Regulations so provided." 2 In 1937,
however, the Regulations were amended to include a transfer with a
reservation of income "the actual enjoyment of which, by the decedent,
was to be poftponed until the termination of a transferred precedent
interest or estate.'"' 93 The corpus then would be included irrespective
of whether the settlor, by surviving the intermediate life tenant, was
in actual enjoyment of the income at the time of his death. The Tax
Court has taken the view that the original ruling was correct.1"' Ac-
cepting this theory, a minority of the Tax Court has argued that the
transfer is includible under another part of Section 811(c): viz., as a
reservation of income by the settlor for a period " 'not ascertainable
without reference' to [his] death." 195
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found the corpus
of such a trust includible, 9 ' but without stating whether a contingent
life interest is a reservation by the settlor (a) for a period "which does
not in fact end before his death" or (b) for a period "not ascertainable
without reference to his death." It may be that the court thought that
either clause would trap the transfer, though the dissenting minority
of the Tax Court had thought only the second would do.' This also
appears to be the Treasury's current construction.19 The significance
of the distinction is that clause (a) is declaratory of the Joint Resolu-
191. See note 127 supra.
192. E. T. 5, XIII-2 Cum. Buu.. 369 (1934).
193. U.S. Treas. Reg. 80, art. 18(a) (1937). See U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18.
194. Estate of Curie, 4 T.C. 1175 (1945).
195. Estate of Nathan, 6 T.C. 604, 608 (1946) (dissenting opinion), rcv'd, sub nons,
Commissioner v. Estate of Nathan, 159 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947).
196. Commissioner v. Estate of Nathan, mtpra note 195.
197. Estate of Nathan, 6 T.C. 604, 608 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
198. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18.
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tion and hence of the pre-1931 statutory phrase; consequently, pre-1931
transfers of this type would now be taxable. Clause (b), on the other
hand, is said to be a change of substance from the earlier law; I if
trusts of this type are included only by virtue of this clause, only those
made after 1932 will be taxable. But the latter view leads to the
astonishing conclusion that the Joint Resolution overruled May v.
Heiner only in part (viz., where the settlor survives the intermediate
life tenant), leaving untouched the very situation involved in that case
(-viz., where the settlor does not survive the intermediate life tenant).-
The remaining two changes effected by the Revenue Act of 1932 are
explained as follows:
"(1) The insertion of the words 'or for any period not ascertain-
able without reference to his death,' is to reach, for example, a
transfer where decedent reserved to himself semiannual pa)ments
of the income of a trust which he had established, but vith the
provision that no part of the trust income between the last semi-
annual payment to him and his death should be paid to him or
his estate, or where he reserves the income, not necessarily for the
remainder of his life, but for a period in the ascertainment of
which the date of his death was a necessary element.
"(4) The insertion of the words 'either alone or in conjunction
with any person' is to reach a case where decedent had a right, with
the concurrence of another person or persons, to designate those
who should possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from." 201
Since, as stated above, the committees acknowledge that the amend-
ments introduced some "new matter . . . without retroactive effect,"
it may be surmised that, at least to some extent, these two changes go
to substance.20 2 If so, they reach transfers which were exempt under
the Joint Resolution and hence under the original "possession and en-
joyment" clause.
Change (1) embraces a device which is so patently an evasion of the
existing statute that explicit inclusion seems unnecessary. A retention
of income for life less a brief period could have been regarded, without
stretching the Joint Resolution's phrase, as a transfer "for his life or
for [a] period not ending before his death." And with the overruling of
May v. Heiner, it could with equal propriety be regarded as a transfer
199. Change (1), next paragraph.
200. Avoidance of this astonishing conclusion requires a sacrifice of the Committee
statement that a transfer with contingent life estate may be taxed under clause (a)-as
a reservation for a period "which does not in fact end before his death"--only when the
life tenant predeceases the settlor.
201. 1939-1 Cum. Buu.m (Part 2) 490, 532.
202. Note that changes (2) and (3), 1939-1 CuO.m BuLT. (Part 2) 490, 532, are spe-
cifically described as "clarifying."
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to take effect "at death." Yet the Regulations have accepted change
(1) as non-declaratory; they provide that if income is reserved for life
less the quarterly period in which death occurs, for example, the trans-
fer is not included unless it occurred after June 6, 1932.03 Until the
Church case, the issue was not of major importance; since pre-1931
transfers were protected by May v. Heiner, the Treasury was over-
looking only transfers between March 3, 1931 and June 6, 1932. But
with the overruling of M11ay v. Heiner, it is surprising that the proposed
amendments 114 to the Regulations take no account of these trusts.
Change (2) is palpably more substantial. At least if the grantor's
power to designate the income beneficiary can be exercised only with
the consent of a person with a substantial adverse interest, there is
much to say for the view that he has not reserved a life estate or the
equivalent. But what if he needs only the consent of a disinterested
person? Was a specific provision then required to embrace the trans-
fer? Or would an enlightened court have found the consent of an inno-
cent bystander so feeble a restriction that it could be ignored? 20 If so,
the transfer would have been taxable by virtue of the Joint Resolution
and hence, with the overruling of May v. Heiner, by virtue of the pre-
1931 statutory language. Here again the existing Regulations concede,
perhaps more broadly than necessary, that the 1932 change went to
substance, 28 and the proposed amendments do not concern them-
selves with the issue.
203. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18 (b).
204. 141ED. REG. 1824 (1949).
205. The 1932 provision taxing the transfer when the decedent's right to designate
is exercisable "either alone or in conjunction with any person" finds a counterpart In
Section 811(d). Since the Revenue Act of 1924 this provision (or its predecessors) has
taxed transfers with a power to alter, amend, or revoke exercisable "either by the deced-
ent alone or in conjunction with any person." Yet the Regulations provide that pre-1924
transfers with power to alter, amend, or revoke are includible (a) if exercisable by the
decedent alone or in conjunction with any person or persons not having a substantial ad-
verse interest and (b) even if exercisable only in conjunction with persons having a sub-
stantial adverse interest, to the extent of the interest of any person whose consent is not
required or whose interest is not substantial. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.20(b) (1). In
effect, the Regulations provide that there is no difference between a power exercisable
by the settlor himself and one exercisable with the consent of one who has no substantial
interest in opposing the settlor. The reasoning is equally applicable to Section 811(c),
and would lead to the conclusion that the 1932 provision was declaratory except as to
powers exercisable only in conjunction with persons having a substantial adverse interest.
206. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.19(2).
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